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.Among the many relationships which the United States government 
has entertained with the Indian nations over the past two centuries, 
there have been few that have had the popular attraction and attention 
which has been given to that with the Nez Perce Indian nation. The 
relationship between the United States government and the Nez Perce 
Indian nation has drawn the attention of popular and scholarly writers 
from several fields. 
The great attention focused on the Nez Perce nation is due to 
a mystique developing out of a number of events. The first event which 
gave the Nez Perce special notice was their interaction with the ex-
plorers Lewis and Clark. Clark, writing in his journal in 1805, wrote 
of the Nez Perce: 
Those people has shewn* much greater acts of hospitality 
than we have witnessed from any nation or tribe since we 
have passed the rocky mountains. in short be it spoke to 
their innnortal honor it is the only act which diserves the 
appelation of hospitallity we have witnessed in this quarter. 
(DeVoto, 1953, p. 380) 
From this amicable start in relations, the Nez Perce nation and the 
United States. government and its citizens continued to interact over 
the next 71 years. At this point a portion of the Nez Perce nation took 
up arms against the citizens of the United States and federal troops. 
*Many of the original documents from which direct quotations are taken 
have errors in spelling, grammar and mechanics. Direct quotations 
used in this study are faithful to the original documents. The term 
(sic), therefore, will not appear in the text. 
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This armed encounter has attracted a great deal of attention for the 
tribe and is the most significant event of the interaction in the 
eyes of many. Yale historian Alvin M. Josephy (1965) illustrated 
the attraction and importance of the war when he wrote: 
I 
But all pale before the thundering climax of the Nez Perce 
Story, the valiant attempt of Chief Joseph and part of the 
tribe in 1877 to escape their white tormentors in a great 
1,700 mile retreat, fighting and defeating American armies 
all the way until a last tragic battle. (p. xx) 
Although Josephy indicates that events of the Nez Perce history pale 
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in comparison with the war, there are a number of other important events 
in the U. S.-Nez Perce interaction. One of the most important was the 
treaty of 1855, which is the subject of this study. 
The Study 
This study will analyze the bargaining processes and spoken 
communication as recorded in the official transcripts of the Council 
of 1855 in the valley of Walla Walla. The purpose of the study is to 
determine the impact of the bargaining processes and communication on 
the success, or lack thsreof, of the participants at the Council. 
There are several reasons to study the treaty bargaining between 
the Nez Perce nation and other tribes and the United States government. 
One of the reasons is the continuing question of the United States Govern-
ment observing the commitments made in treaties with the Indians. The 
questioning is illustrated by tp.e demands of a group of American Indians 
who occupied the Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington, 
D.C. in 1972. One of the demands submitted to the government during 
the takeover was the following: 
COMMISSION TO REVIEW TREATY COMMITMENTS & VIOLATIONS: 
The president should immediately create a multi-lateral, 
Indian and non-Indian Commission to review domestic treaty 
commitments and complaints of chronic violations and to 
recommend or act for corrective actions, including the im-
position of mandatory sanctions or interim restraints upon 
violative activities, including formulation of legislation 
designed to protect the jeopardized Indian rights and elimi-
nate the unending pattern of prohibitively expensive lawsuits 
and legal defenses--which habitually have produced indeci-
sive and indeterminate results, only too frequently forming 
guidelines for more court battles, or additional challenges 
and attacks against Indian rights. (1972) 
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Another reason for studying the bargaining interactions between 
the Nez Perce nation and its people and the United States government 
and its people is the question of romance and realism, i.e., fiction 
and fact. Although a great deal of attention has been given to the 
Nez Perce question, scholars in recent years have argued that much of 
the previous work on the Nez Perce nation and its peoples has been 
erroneous or misleading. Walker (1968) argues: 
Many such studies, for example, Fee (1936), Haines (1955), 
Howard (1881), Josephy (1965), and McWhorter (1940 and 1953), 
fail to interpret correctly the principal issues, personalities 
and events of the War. (pref.) 
It is the argument of Walker that there was a "cult" (p. 32) faction 
among the Nez Perce during the interactions between the Nez Perce 
and the Whites. He argues that the cult factions were in large measure 
responsible for the schism among the Nez Perce people and that the schism 
was an impelling force in the shaping of many of the choices of the 
Nez Perce bands, including the sending of a delegation to St. Louis in 
1831 to seek missionaries and the teaching of the Bible. Walker suggests 
that the Nez Perce were not seeking the teachings of the Bible for 
salvation purposes, as was popularly believed at the time, but that they 
were seeking the Bible for the power they believed resided with those 
who had the book. An extensive consideration of this argument will be 
taken up in Chapter Three. 
Historian Mark Brown is also caustic in his analysis of pre-
vious works. He states: 
It is unfortunate that Indian accounts merit very little 
trust. What purports to be Chief Joseph's story went through 
an interpreter and at least one magazine editor before it 
appeared on the pages of the North American Review in 1879. 
Such devious treatment is not desirable in intelligence mater-
ials. Lucullus V. McWhortei, who collected the bu~k cf th~ 
Nez Perce narratives was apparently neither objective or 
discriminating. Although some of the material is probably 
accurate, too much of it shows the same weaknesses that may 
easily be found in similar narratives written by white people, 
namely faulty memories, personal bias and prejudice. In some 
cases these can be established beyond question by comparison 
with contemporary records of the highest order of reliability. 
This is regrettable, but it is also hard fa-ct. (196-7-, p. 15)-
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The treaties will be analyzed with the recognition of the new findings by 
Walker and the understanding that some of the previous works may be suspect. 
Cross-cultural filters are also an important part of this study. 
Edward T. Hall (1959), as well as others, has argued that each individual 
brings a myriad of attitudes, beliefs, and values to any given interaction. 
He argues that many of the attitudes, beliefs, and values brought to an 
interaction by an individual are the result of culture, and that in many 
cases the attitudes, beliefs and values are strongly held, but that the 
individual is hardly aware that he holds them or acts in accordance with 
them. As a result, the individual is affected by these cultural filters. 
The understanding of cultural filters is important in analyzing the actions 
of the individuals within the treaty bargaining for several reasons. 
First, it is important to recognize that the individuals participating in 
the interaction may have been affected by their cultural filters, and 
therefore have distorted the positions of the other parties to the inter-
action. Second, it is important to recognize cultural filters in the 
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current analysis. It is essential to be cognizant of the values, 
attitudes and beliefs which prevailed in the time period in which the 
treaty was negotiated when attempting to analyze the strategies of 
the parties. Third, the cultural filters must be recognized in regard 
to the materials used in the study. All of the extant material, in-
cluding the transcript of the Council, is written in English, most 
by non-Indi~n writers. It must be recognized that the treaty was 
negotiated through interpreters. This resulted because the Nez Perce 
leaders and other Indian Chiefs did not speak or understand the English 
language. Therefore, it must be recognized that the record may be 
subject to inaccuracies of interpretation and the natural distortion 
of translating from one language to another. We shall deal more with 
this subject in Chapter Four. 
Arguments of the Study 
We shall argue in this study that the treaty bargaining sessions 
which culminated in the treaty of Walla Walla were mixed-motive-situations. 
This position is contrary to some widely-held positions that all govern-
ment-Indian negotiations were zero-sum situations, and that the Indians 
had no opportunities to gain from the bargaining procedures. This analysis 
will show that the government and Indians had opportunities for in-
dividual and joint gains and losses during the course of the negotiations. 
Further, we shall argue that the corrnnunication behaviors of the 
parties, exhibited during the bargaining processes of search, strategy 
and persuasion, directly influenced the nature of the final agreement. 
The effect of the influence was the formalizing of an agreement, which 
when viewed from the perspective of the probabilities and utilities held 
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by the parties, was nearly optimal for all concerned. We shall deal 
more with this argument in our conclusions. 
The Analysis Tools 
The analysis of the bargaining and communication in the Council 
sessions will be conducted using the Search, Strategy and Persuasion 
framework of bargaining developed by Cohen (1972) and the Verbal Per-
suasive Strategies model developed by Beisecker (1968). Cohen, working 
with the theory of negotiated games developed by Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1964), has developed a perspective for looking at the bargaining 
process as three interrelated processes of search, strategy- and per-
suasion. Cohen argues that modifications of the theory of negotiated 
games by Schelling (1960) and others have inverted the original theory 
from one which describes a hypothetical process through which two per-
fectly rational and informed parties could arrive at a decision in a 
mixed-motive situation to one in which the assumptions define sources 
of variability rather than constants. He suggests that defining and 
analyzing bargaining as the three interrelated processes of search, 
strategy and persuasion--each with their own logic--allows for a more 
realistic understanding of the bargaining process. Cohen argues that 
search is to invent or discover new or forgotten alternatives which are 
preferable to alternatives under consideration, strategy is the attempt 
to manipulate events under your control to force your opponent to accept 
an alternative you prefer in the alternatives under consideration and 
persuasion is the attempt to alter your opponent's probability or value 
for alternatives under consideration. The development of Cohen's 
theory and its application to this study will be more fully explicated 
when we develop the theoretical frameworks for this study in Chapter 
Two. 
Using the same antecedent theories as Cohen, Beisecker has 
come to a swomewhat similar position; however, the position is cast 
in somewhat different terms. Working from the standpoint of commun-
ication in bargaining, Beisecker argues that when the conditions of 
"perfectly rational and informed parties are not met at the outset of 
the interaction" (1970, p. 153), they must be approximated as much as 
r 
possible through the interaction itself. Further, he argues that 
"direct verbal communication serves_ as the primary vehicle for_ such 
approximation." (p. 153). 
Beisecker indicates in his model that the participants to the 
bargaining situation may communicate cooperatively or competitively, 
depending on the attributes of the situation. However, regardless of 
how the participant communicates, the communication can 
.focus on any of four general attributes of the mixed-
motive situation •• These are (1) the identification and 
reassessment of the participants preferences, (2) the 
identification and reassessment of their interpersonal 
relationship, (3) the transmission and evaluation of of-
fers, and (4) procedural mechanics involved in the nego-
tiation process. (1970, p. 154) 
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The application of this framework to the treaty bargaining will 
be developed in Chapter Two. In addition, the communication framework 
will be integrated with the bargaining theory of Cohen during the course 
of the chapter. 
Historical Sources 
The primary focus of this study is on the spoken bargaining 
communication as it appears in the government transcripts of the sessions. 
I have chosen to use the transcript as published in Noon-Ne-Me-Foo (We 
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the Nez Perce). The book is the official history of the Nez Perce and 
includes the vital documents of the tribe's history. The transcript 
appearing in Noon-Ne-Me-Poo is taken from the handwritten transcripts 
appearing in the microfilmed records of the United States Government 
Indian Bureau. To assure that the transcript published by the Nez Perce 
was true to the original, it was compared with the transcript of LuCullus 
McWhorter. This comparison revealed no substantive differences. 
I have relied on the works of Coan (1921 and 1922) when develop-
ing arguments in regard to the formation of United States government 
policy toward the Indians of the Northwest. The Coan study is baseQ on 
the original documents relating to the development and execution 
of United States Government Indian Policy in the Northwest during the period 
immediately preceding the treaty of Walla Walla. The work is cited by 
nearly every researcher who has, during the past 60 years, studied Indian 
policy of this period and/or government-Indian interaction in the 
region. The work has not been challenged for accuracy or perspective. 
The work is cited extensively in the works of Josephy (1965) and Walker 
(1968). Although Walker raises serious question about the interpretation 
of Josephy, he does not quarrel with the findings of Coan, and to 
the contrary, relies heavily on Coan's findings to explain government-
Indian interactions. For these reasons, I believe the work is adequate 
for this study. 
Plan of the Study 
Chapter Two of this study will consider the theoretical work of 
Cohen and Beisecker and will integrate the two theoretical models. 
Chapter Three will present the history of the Nez Perce nation and the 
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U. S. government policy toward the Indians of the Northwest. The purpose 
of this history is to set the values of the~working parties at the treaty 
negotiations. Chapter Four will analyze the communication behaviors 
in the bargaining of the treaty. Chapter Five will analyze the successes 
and failures of the parties. 
CHAPTER TWO 
This chapter presents the two models which provide the 
methodological framework for this study. We shall first present 
and discuss Cohen's trimodal theory of bargaining--search, strategy 
and persuasion. Secondly, we shall present and discuss Beisecker's 
bargaining communication model. The presentations and discussions 
will review the sources of the theories, outline basic tenets, and 
consider strengths and weaknesses of each. The chapter concludes 
with an integration of the two models and their relationship to 
the study undertaken for this thesis. 
Search, Strategy and Persuasion 
Working from the perspective of modified game-theory, Cohen 
presents a model for a more precise understanding and evaluation of 
the bargaining process. Cohen argues that it is incorrect to view 
bargaining as a simple, single dimensional behavior and suggests 
that bargaining interactions should be considered as a series of 
interrelated activities--those of search, strategy and persuasion. 
To understand how Cohen derives his theory it is necessary to 
review his analysis of game-theoretic bargaining literature. Cohen 
begins his analysis at the point where nearly all literature on this 
subject begins--with Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior. Cohen argues that Von Neumann and Morgenstern's 
framework of game-theoretic bargaining is built on the following four 
assumptions: 
1. There is a set of events which constitute all the 
possible outcomes of the interdependent choices confront-
ing the participants. 
2. Each individual assigns a fixed utility to each 
outcome event. 
3. In some cases, notably in two person zero-sum games, 
probabilities can be inferred for outcomes, and hence for 
the choices of others from the assignment of utilities 
obtaining among the players. I-n most cases this is not 
possible and bargaining fixes the outcome. 
4. Each individual is aware of the utility assigned 
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to each possible outcome by every other participant. (pp. 42-43). 
While indicating that this framework of zero-sum interactions is of 
limited value for his orientation, Cohen suggests that the concepts 
of events, probabilities and utilities are extremely important. He 
argues that game theory is built on these three elements (p. 42). 
Cohen defines events as "the things that can happen," and utilities 
as "each player's preferences among the various possible outcomes" (p. 42). 
He does not explicitly define probability, although a review of his 
position indicates that he believes probabilities are related to the 
chance of an event occurring. We shall consider his perspective 
on probabilities in more detail when reviewing his interpretation of 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) 
Cohen argues that the terms events, probabilities and utilities 
are associated with the very formal assumptions of game theory. After 
suggesting modification of the assumptions above, Cohen attaches the 
term likelihood to the bargainer's estimate of an event occurring. 
He also attaches the term value to the bargainer's relative preferences 
among outcomes. He further argues that the change is a recognition of 
the movement away from the more formal assumptions associated with 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's original presentation. 
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Cohen continues his analysis of previous work by turning to 
Luce and Raiffa. He suggests that there was little done with the 
theory of games until 1957, when Luce and Raiffa published their 
codification of game theory. Cohen argues that Luce and Raiffa make 
central the underlying relation of game theory to the theory of indivi-
dual decision making, and is organized around the distinction between 
certainty, risk and uncertainty (p. 44). Luce and Raiffa have defined 
these terms: 
(A) Certainty if each action is known to lead invari-
ably to a specific outcome (the words prospect, stimulus, 
alternative, etc., are also used). 
(B) Risk if each action leads to one of a set of 
possible specific outcomes, each outcome occurring with a 
known probability. The probabilities are assumed to be 
known to the decision maker .. 
(C) Uncertainty if either action or both has as its 
consequence a set of possible specific outcomes, but 
where the probabilities of these outcomes are completely 
unknown or are not even meaningful (1957, p. 13). 
Cohen concludes that the work of Luce and Raiffa generates 
a number of possible changes in the original assumptions of the theory 
which lead to greater psychological realism. He says that they: 
.. emphsize the importance of distinguishing between 
various levels of knowledge an actor may have of the 
probabilities associated with events. They stress the 
likelihood that actors do not fully know the sets of 
strategies open to themselves or their opponents. They 
suggest that full knowledge of the utilities others have 
for outcomes is often probably not present. They offer 
the possibility that utilities may change during the course 
of bargaining (p. 47). 
But, he argues, Luce and Raiffa do not follow up these suggestions. 
He explains that this is done because each of the changes would lead 
to "mathematical intractability or into a tangle of questions about the 
empirical conditions prevailing in a given situation," (p. 47) which 
was beyond the theory they were presenting. 
Leaving the suggestions of Luce and Raiffa, Cohen turns his 
attention to Schelling's Strategy of Conflict. It is from Schelling 
that Cohen evolves the major thrust of his argument for a trimodal 
approach to the theory of bargaining. 
The center of the Schelling influence on Cohen lies with the 
concept of "perceived or subJective probability" (p. 48). Cohen 
indicates that this particular viewpoint succeeds "in applying semi-
formal game theoretic reasoning" (p. 48) to a variety of situations. 
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He further argues that Schelling has taken a "fundamentally different 
look at the problems of indeterminacy of variable sum interactions in 
game theory. Rather than look for additional assumptions that might 
eliminate it, he has instead said that it corresponds to an indeter-
minacy in the worl~' ( p. 49). Cohen argues this position moves 
Schelling toward his proposed theory of interdependent decision, but 
also moves it simultaneously away from the formal power of game theory. 
Cohen indicates that Schelling maintains the knowledge assump-
tions of game theory but is ambivalent on the fixed nature of the 
alternative actions or outcomes (p. 50). He argues that Schelling on 
one hand treats outcomes as givens, but on the other hand argues that 
strategic moves will alter the outcomes. Further, he cites Schelling 
as contending that many of the strategic moves must be "found" rather 
than given. 
Cohen says that the use of the strategic actions of threat, 
promise and commitment is central to the Schelling theory of inter-
dependent decision. Schelling gives an extensive treatment to each of 
these actions and their roles in gaining decisions in situations in which 
there is a mixture of cooperative and conflicting elements on which 
the bargainers may focus. 
Integrating the changes suggested by Luce and Raiffa and 
Schelling, Cohen argues that the original assumptions of Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern can now be stated as: 
1. The unmanageably large- size of the set of alter--
natives which must be considered under strict game theoretic 
analysis has been recognized, but careful inquiry has not 
been made into the consequences of this condition. 
2. The fixed utility assumption has been recognized 
as a point of vulnerability (by Luce and Raiffa), but 
no effort has been made to extend the theory to cases of 
dynamic preferences. 
3. The indeterminacy of the variable sum of more than 
two-person game situations is recognized by all. A great 
deal of effort has been made to resolve this indeterminacy 
by making slightly different assumptions. (Luce and Raiffa, 
Nash and subsequently many others including Harsanyi 1967, 
1968a, 1968b.) Schelling has argued, however,, that the 
indeterminacy of theory corresponds to an indeterminacy 
in the world, which strategic moves such as threats, pro-
mises, and commitments can be seen as attempting to resolve. 
In both Luc~ and Raiffa and Schelling there is increasing 
attention to the subjective character of the probabilities 
involved. 
4. The unrealistic character of the knowledge assump-
tion has been pointed out (both by Luce and Raiffa and by 
Schelling), but this recognition of its inadequacies has 
not been incorporated into new theory (pp. 56-57). 
Indicating that Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Luce and Raiffa 
and Schelling are the major contributors to the theory of games and 
to the more general theory of bargaining that he is following, Cohen 
turns his attention to the laboratory application of game theory. 
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He reviews the works of Rapoport, especially Fights, Games and Debates, 
and Thibaut and Kelley's Social Psychology of Groups. Cohen argues 
that the authors of these two books make substantial contributions to 
laboratory gaming and thus represent an important link from the 
theoretical framework of game theory to the laboratory phase of 
bargaining research (p. 57). 
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Considering Rapoport's impact on the reinterpretation of game 
theory, Cohen centers on the questions of utilities and the role of 
communication in game-theoretic applications. It is Rapoport who 
criticises game theory for its lack of rigorous analysis when communi-
cation is a move in the game. Furthermore, Cohen stresses that Rapoport 
suggests that the complexity of game analysis, even on simple games, 
makes it a rather unwieldy tool for analysis. Although Rapoport 
suggests several shortcomings, and some possible changes in game 
theory, Cohen argues that his work does not carry the issues far 
beyond the theoretical positions. However, Cohen points out that 
Rapoport adds substantially to the advance of theory of bargaining by 
suggesting that the research work should be taken over by the experi-
mental scientists, which is in agreement with Luce and Raiffa and 
Schelling (p. 62). 
In reviewing and criticizing Thibaut and Kelley's work, Cohen 
argues that they recognize the possibility of unknown utilities and, 
thus, unknown payoffs, but in the bulk of their work tend to work with 
situations which hold to the classic model, where the utilities and 
payoffs are given. Cohen further suggests that Thibaut and Kelley's 
position on the actor's knowledge of the alternatives available to 
the other or their associated utilities is ambiguous and must be 
drawn from their work by implication. Cohen draws the implication 
that Thibaut and Kelley stay close to the full-knowledge position in 
some of their later research. 
The final two works reviewed by Cohen are Ikle and Leites (1962) 
and Walton and McKersie (1965). These are cited specifically 
because they frontally attack some of the classic game-theoretic 
assumptions, while holding to some of the basic framework. Cohen 
\ 
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suggests that Ikle and Leites argue directly that bargaining should be 
based on the possibility of utility change (p. 68). Walton and McKersie, 
Cohen argues, also attack the fixed utilities concept during the course 
of the negotiations. 
The discussion above indicates the need for the development of 
modified assumptions. Cohen now recasts the assumptions as follows: 
1. At any given moment there exists for an i"ndividual 
a set of events which constitute the possible outcomes* 
of the bargaining. The membership of this set may change 
over time. 
2. At any given moment an individual has a value for 
each event currently in the set of possible outcomes. That 
value may change over time. 
3. At any given moment an individual has some estimate 
of the likelihood of each event currently in the set of 
possible outcomes. That estimate may change over time. 
4. At any given moment an individual's estimate, if 
he has one, of the value or likelihood for an event held 
by an opponent may vary in the accuracy with which it 
approximates the value or likelihood actually held by that 
opponent at that moment. This estimate may also change 
over time (pp. 72-73). 
Before considering the three modes of search, strategy and 
persuasion, which Cohen says come out of the new assumptions, it is 
necessary to consider Cohen's justification of the new assumptions. 
Cohen indicates that it is his belief that there is ''more to bargaining 
than the simple exchange of threats, commitments and promises, which 
*(Cohen, in a footnote, indicates that he is defining possible 
outcomes--in assumption 1~-as those outcomes which are under consider-
ation, or have recently been under consideration. He argues that it 
is realistic to acknowledge that the bargainer actually considers only 
a small set of all possible solutions.) 
are at the center of attention in a work like Schelling's" (p. 75). 
It is Cohen's hope that the new "assumptions will help to reveal 
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what else there is, and to show what relationship it has to the stra-
tegic actions of which we have a somewhat better understanding" (p. 75). 
He says the new assumptions support his insight that "bargaining situa-
tions are indeterminate, and the conditions whieh create that indeter--
minacy are the wellsprings of the actions people may engage in to 
resolve it in their own favor" (p. 77). He argues that his position 
is more realistic with the way things are in the world, and he admits 
that this position moves bargaining away from the formal power of 
the original theory of games. He suggests that the gain in realism is 
worth the price in mathematical tractability (p. 75). It is out of 
these modified assumptions that Cohen develops the theory of search, 
strategy and persuasion. 
It is essential at this point to present a more precise defini-
tion of the three modes proposed by Cohen. He defines his modes in the 
following manner: 
Search. Attempt to discover or invent some new alter-
native, not previously under consideration (or even an old 
one which has somehow been dropped from consideration), 
which is acceptable to the opponent and preferable to the 
ava±labl~ outcomes. 
Strategy. Attempt by manipulating events under your 
influence or control, or by talking about such manipulations, 
to force your opponent to accept some alternative which 
you prefer from the current set of possible outcomes. 
Persuasion. Attempt to alter your opponent's like-
lihoods and/or values for events so that he prefers and 
chooses some alternative whi~h you prefer from the current 
set (p. 42). 
Cohen argues that the concept of search is a direct outgrowth of 
the first assumption. In order for persons to be able to bring new 
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alternatives into the bargaining situation, it is essential that the 
parties have the ability to "find" them. If it is possible for persons to 
locate and introduce new alternatives into the consideration, then this 
implicitly suggests that the parties have some mode of operation to 
carry this out. Cohen argues that search is the reasonable choice. 
Cohen further argues that the modes of persuasion anfr strategy 
follow directly from the modified assumptions two, three and four. The 
critical consideration here is that the assumptions suggest that the 
parties to the bargaining may change their utilities and/or estimates of 
probabilities over the course of the bargaining. Again, this suggests 
that the individual must have some mode of operation which allows this 
to occur. Cohen argues that the use of persuasion and strategy are 
reasonable choices for defining how parties in the bargaining are able to 
alter the utilities and probabilities. A more extensive consideration 
of the nature of each of the modes and how they interrelate is discussed 
in the consideration of the internal workings of each of the modes. 
Cohen earls these workings the "logic" of the modes. 
The "Logic" of Search, Strategy and Persuasion 
In order to understand the interrelationship of the three pro-
cesses suggested for bargaining, it is necessary to explore the particular 
nature of each of the three proposed modes. After consideration of each 
of the modes independently, predictions about the nature of their inter-
relationship is presented. 
Strategy 
Cohen's position on strategy is similar to that of Schelling and 
includes the behaviors of threat, commitment and promise. The basic 
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purpose of the strategic action is to bind oneself to a particular position 
in order to leave the other party with a clear choice of alternatives, thus, 
hopefully, forcing the other person into a choice desirable to the actor. 
It is Cohen's argument that the process of strategy will bring about iden-
tification of the actor's values. He argues that the person who is 
willing to make a threat, promise or commitment-has defined rather- rigidly 
his preferences in the given situation. Therefore, this will give the 
target of the threat, commitment or promise a rather well-defined perception 
of the actor's abilities. If this is the case, Cohen argues, then the 
target will have the opportunity of seeking search or persuasive strategies 
which might have the effect of meeting the actor's position. This is not 
to say that the target will necessarily undertake any activity--only 
that if he should choose to do so, his action should be facilitated by 
his knowledge of the actor's values. Accordingly, the value revealing 
nature of the strategic action results in a cost to the actor. He has 
exposed himself to the target and may be more vulnerable to search and 
persuasive activities on the part of the target. 
Persuasion 
In his definition of strategy and persuasion, Cohen makes the 
distinction between the ability to control events, and altering the other 
party's perceptions of the utility and probability of an event. In 
strategy, the actor is able to control the events which he manipulates, 
or talks about manipulating. In persuasion, the actor does not control 
the events themselves, but only is able to attempt to alter the target's 
perceptions of their utility, or their probability of occurring. Cohen 
suggests that persuasion does not reveal in as clear terms as strategy 
the values of the actor. An example of this difference may prove helpful. 
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In the case of a husband and wife considering dining out, the husband 
may choose a restaurant about which his wife is not overly fond. He may 
state, "we will go to my place, or I am staying home." In this case 
he has in fact threatened (used strategy) because he controls the event, 
i.e., he can stay home. On the other hand, he can say, "remember 
the fine meal we had the last time we went there?" This is persuasion 
because he is attempting to alter his wife's utility, while not being 
in a position to control the event, i.e., he cannot make his wife's 
decision. While both approaches suggest the husband's wish to go 
to a particular restaurant, the second does not suggest the rigidity 
of choice implicit in the first statement. Cohen suggests that this is 
in fact the case when using strategy and persuasion, and therefore the 
use of strategy more rigidly defines the actor's values than does persua-
sion. Accordingly, Cohen argues that the cost to the actor is somewhat 
less when using persuasion than when using strategy. 
Cohen indicates that there are two major findings in current 
persuasion research which bear directly upon the approa~h to persu~sion 
in the bargaining situation. The two are that: 
.•. when efforts to persuade fail, subsequent efforts by the 
same persuader are less likely to succeed, and that a target's 
expressing a belief reduces the effectiveness of subsequent 
efforts. (pp. 94-95) 
Cohen says a persuader becomes more attached to the position which 
he is supporting as he expounds the position, and the persons who is 
the target becomes more entrenched against the position as he continues 
to resist the persuasion. From this, he argues that each attempt 
to persuade has a declining chance of success. This assertion is 
left unsupported and should be tested before acceptance. 
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An additional point regarding persuasion and its interaction 
with search should be explored. Cohen suggests the persuasive argument 
will generally downgrade, "implicitly or explicitly, the potential 
value of additional search" (p. 96). A persuasive action is an attempt 
to get a target to accept an alternative which the actor is already 
in support of. In this way, persuasion is an attempt to limit the realm 
of alternatives under discussion in the particular situation. 
Search 
In his consideration of search, Cohen argues that this mode 
does not have the impact on subsequent bargaining that the value reveal-
ing nature of strategy, or the likelihood-fixing nature of persuasion 
(p. 101). The search mode works in two ways--one negative, one positive. 
Negatively, search indicates that none of the alternatives under con-
sideration are acceptable. This may be true if either strategic actions 
or persuasive actions are directed at a target. The actor knows that 
the target does not like the alternative, but the actor does not know 
what kind of alternatives the target will accept. Positively, the search 
mode brings into the interaction some alternative that is not under 
consideration at that time. 
Cohen suggests two situational consideration which influence 
the utility of search. First, as the number of persons in the bargaining 
situation increases, so does the difficulty of finding new preferable 
outcomes. Second, each new alternative will be harder to find (p. 103). 
Cohen argues that the first consideration results from the assumption 
that the new alternative must be better for one party, and at least as 
good for the rest of the parties as the previous alternatives. The 
second consideration results from his assertion that each new alternative 
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will take more energy to generate because the easy alternatives will 
be found early and the more difficult alternatives must be discovered 
at greater cost of mental energy. These considerations have not been 
tested, but they would seem worthy of exploration. 
In a last argument, Cohen supports the position that there will 
be exceptions, such as an excellent alternative being overlooked in 
the original bargaining procedures, but being found with relative ease 
in a review. However, he indicates that the pattern he sees search taking 
is one in which each alternative requires more energy, and thus search 
will become less frequent as the interaction is extended. His assumption 
here is that the energy needed for search will increase faster than the 
energy demands for persuasion. This assertion is also worthy of testing. 
Having indicated the basic logic of each of the modes, the question 
of their applicability to the study of bargaining and communication must 
be bridged. 
Limitations of the Recast 
From- a communication standpoint, the most obvious shortcoming 
of the model presented by Cohen is that it is a theory of bargaining--
not a theory of communication. Cohen suggests three modes of action, 
but does not explicitly indicate how the modes are manifested, with the 
exception of persuasion, which he says is usually a communication function. 
It would seem that communication is an essential part of each of the modes 
in that some form of communication is necessary if the parties to the 
bargaining are going to know that search has occurred, that strategy is 
being employed, or that persuasion is being attempted. The emphasis on 
bargaining theory tends to limit the consideration of communication in 
the bargaining process. 
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Cohen's recast of the game-theoretic assumptions suggests how 
bargaining should be viewed, but there is little in the study to indicate 
what specific communication behaviors one would expect from the parties 
during the course of their interactions. Although he is not concerned 
with specific communication behaviors, we have argued earlier that communi-
cation is an implied process for the functioning of the three modes of action. 
It would seem, therefore, that there is a need to find a communication 
model which can operate under the revised game theory assumptions, but 
yet emphasize the role of the communication processes. For that purpose, 
this study makes use of the works of Beisecker (1968 and 1970). 
Beisecker's Model 
Beisecker, also working from the standpoint of the theory of games, 
has formulated a model for analyzing the role of communication in dyadic 
interpersonal mixed-motive interactions. Although he begins with the 
same base as Cohen--the th~ory of negotiated games--he does not follow the 
same path. He, like others reviewed by Cohen, holds to a more rigid set 
of assumptions than are presented in the modifications leading to search, 
strategy and persuasion. Despite working with the more classical assump-
tions, Beisecker seems to accept the idea that many of the strong assump-
tions in regard to knowledge and utilities may not be present at the outset 
of the mixed-motive interaction. He states: 
The theory of negotiated games describes a hypothetical 
process through which two perfectly rational and informed 
parties can arrive at a decision in mixed-motive situations. 
When these conditions are not present at the outset of an 
interaction, they must be approximated as much as possible 
through the course of the interaction itself. Direct verbal 
communication can serve as the primary vehicle for such 
approximation (1970, p. 153). 
Working with the more rigid assumptions for utilities and 
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preferences, Beisecker presents a model for analysis of communication 
which would seem to be applicable to situations where the modified 
assumptions are accepted, Beisecker argues that communication, whether 
used cooperatively or competitively, can focus on four general attributes 
of a mixed-motive interaction. They are: 
.•• (1) the identification and reassessment of the parti-
cipants' preferences, (2) the identification and reassess-
ment of their interpersonal relationships, (3) the trans-
mission and evaluation of offers, and (4) procedural mechanics 
involved in the negotiation process (1970, p. 154). 
Beisecker defines cooperative communication by function, stating: 
Cooperative communication essentially serves as a vehicle 
through which individuals attempt to discover and increase 
areas of common interest regarding the issue. Communi-
cation can identify previously unnoticed alternatives, test 
and reaffirm or modify evaluative criteria for alternatives, 
and structure more consistently their own preferences and 
the preferences of the other. Walton and McKersie suggest 
that such communication be labeled "problem solving" communi-
cation (1970, p. 154). 
The definition would indicate that Beisecker sees cooperative communi-
cation as serving many of the same functions as Cohen's concept of search. 
Dealing with competitive communication, Beisecker indicates: 
Competitive communication serves as a vehicle through 
which one individual attempts to distort the other's per-
ceptions of the situation in order to obtain an advantage. 
Strategies for accomplishing this are numerous, including 
misrepresenting the alternatives available and their re-
lative desirability, refusing to admit the addition of 
alternatives or alternate criteria for the evaluation of 
alternatives, insisting on the other's dependence on the 
condition of agreement and on personal independence of such 
a need, demanding a given solution and committing oneself 
to the demand, and so forth. Walton and McKersie also 
discuss this form of communication, suggesting that its 
overall goal is to "estimate and alter the other's percep-
tions of the payoffs which will result from his alternate 
bargaining strategies" (1970, p. 154). 
Thus, it would seem that competitive communication, in Beisecker's terms, 
is very similar to Cohen's concepts of persuasion and strategy. 
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Beisecker suggests that direct verbal communication should be 
viewed as an "intervening variable in mixed-motive interactions." 
He states that a person's choice of communication strategies may "provide 
additional sources of influence on the decision reached" (191-0, p. 154). 
Before leaving the consideration of the Beisecker model, it 
should be pointed out that Beisecker does not deal directly with the idea 
of changing preferences during the course of the interaction, and does 
not deal directly with the question of persuasion in his study. However, 
the passages cited directly above indicate that he believes communication 
can influence parties to a bargaining interaction. It would seem, then, 
that the preferences can also be influenced during the course of the 
interaction. 
Beisecker, Cohen and the Study 
The analysis of the two models leads to the conclusion that 
Beisecker and Cohen are looking at the same human behavior--mixed-motive 
bargaining, and, they are approaching it from the general context of the 
assumptions of the theory of games. Cohen is proposing a genera1 theoretic 
framework of the interrelated processes which may take place in bargaining. 
Although he suggests the interrela-ted processes of search, strategy and 
persuasion, as well as some ways in which they might be expected to inter-
relate, Cohen has not provided a theory of how persons will communicate 
these behaviors in the proposed trimodal approach to the theory of bar-
gaining. Beisecker has proposed a model for analyzing the communication 
behaviors in mixed-motive interactions. This model, although using 
slightly different assumptions from game theory than the assumptions of 
Cohen, would seem to be appropriate for the study of bargaining under the 
trimodal theory of search, strategy and persuasion. 
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Put into another semantic framework, it may be argued that Cohen 
is suggesting the modes which people may use during mixed-motive bar-
gaining and Beisecker is suggesting a model of how communication may be 
used to carry out the modes of action in mixed-motive bargaining. Thus, 
the two models provide a basis for looking at the way the bargaining 
might be expected to unfold, and also the communication strategies which 
might be used during the course of the interaction. If the treaty bar-
gaining between the Nez Perce Indian nation and the United States govern-
ment can be considered mixed-motive bargaining, it would seem that the two 
models would present an appropriate set of tools to analyze the communi-
cation in the bargaining processes. 
The underlying assumptions which Beisecker and Cohen begin with 
are those of game theory. Cohen has developed modifications of the formal 
assumptions of game theory, and Beisecker seems to be sensitive to the 
conditions leading to the modifications. Although Cohen is making some 
modifications in the original assumptions, it is important to recognize 
that he maintains the basic components of the theory. These components 
are utilities or values, probabilities or likelihoods, and events. 
These are the building blocks of the theory and are maintained in the 
modifications. The modifications, it will be remembered, suggest that 
parties to the bargaining do not have full knowledge of the events, utili-
ties and probabilities, and that the events, utilities and probabili-
ites are not fixed over the time of the bargaining, as is proposed in 
the original assumptions. Thus, it can be argued that the modified 
assumptions do not change the basic components which are the bases for 
decisions in bargaining, but do change the expectation of how people are 
going to act in response to their perceptions of these components in the 
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bargaining situation under the modified assumptions that leads Cohen to 
propose his trimodal model of bargaining behavior. Beisecker also anchors 
his model in the recognition of the components when he indicates that 
one of the major aspects which communication can focus upon in the bar-
gaining situation is "the identification and reassessment of individual's 
preferences." 
If both Cohen and Beisecker maintain the concepts of events, 
probabilities and utilities in their theories, then it can be argued that 
an analysis using their models must be concerned with the questions of 
events, probabilities and ut±l1ties. In order to establish the parties' 
estimates of the events, utilities and probabilities, it is, in turn, 
necessary to explore the nature of the parties to the bargaining. This 
exploration is done, for this study, through an analysis of the culture 
of each of the parties and the history of the parties and their inter-
actions with each other. The knowledge that is gained through this 
analysis allows understanding of the parties and their pos±tions at the 
outset o:E:- the bargaining, and-helps to explain the- actions of the pa~ties 
during the course of the bargaining. The analysis of the culture and 
history of the Nez Perce nation and the United States government is 
presented in Chapter Three. 
When considering the actual bargaining sessions, the procedure 
that must be followed is to analyze the transcripts of the treaty negotia-
tions to determine the nature of the communication behaviors exhibited 
by each of the parties to the bargaining. The first portion of the 
analysis will utilize the Beisecker model, exploring the focus of the 
communication. The model will allow the analysis to center upon the 
spoken communication used by the participants. That communication must 
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be the focus of the first portion of the analysis follows from the argument 
that the behaviors suggested by Cohen are not manifest until they are 
communicated. The second portion of the analysis will utilize the Cohen 
model. From the knowledge of the communication behaviors gained through 
the first step of the analysis, it is possible to impute modes of action 
to th~ parties- to the bargaining. This knowledge of the modes or actiorr 
allows for understanding of what modes of action tend to trigger other 
modes of action within the course of the bargaining and, thus, allows an 
examination of Cohen's prediction of how the three modes interrelate 
with each other. 
Summary 
We have seen that Cohen has analyzed the basic assumptions which 
have been used to develop the theory of games. Cohen has suggested a 
number of modifications to the original assumptions. He argues that the 
change in the assumptions reflects a series of criticism~ and_ suggest±ons-
of a number of studies. He further argues that the modifications of the 
assumptions make the theory of games, as modified, a more realistic model 
of bargaining. Growing out of the modified assumptions, Cohen presents 
a new theory of three interrelated processes of bargaining--search, 
strategy and persuasion. The theory presents a model of consideration of 
bargaining, but does not describe the communication roles which might 
be expected in the bargaining process. Beisecker has presented a model 
for analyzing communication in bargaining. The theories of Cohen and 
Beisecker were integrated and represent a methodological model for analyz-
ing the communication in the bargaining between the United States govern-
ment and the Nez Perce Indians. 
CHAPTER THREE 
This chapter provides an analysis of the value structures and 
knowledge held by the parties prior to the 1855 council negotiations. We 
shall argue that the value structures and knowledge held by the parties 
to the negotiations had a significant impact on their perceptions 
of events, utilities or values, and probabilities or likelihoods. 
Further, we shall examine the impact of culture on the parties' values.i 
structures and knowledge through histories of the Nez Perce Indians 
and United States Government Indian policy. The chapter concludes with 
an assessment of the values, and knowledge and/or information held 
by the negotiators at the outset of the 1855 negotiations. 
Value Structures, Knowledge and the Game Theoretic Mode 
We argued earlier that the building blocks of the game-theoretic 
models are events, utilities or values, and probabilities or likelihoods, 
and that these building blocks are maintained under the modified assump-
tions of Cohen and the Beisecker model. We will further argue that an 
understanding of actors' values is essential for analyzing communication 
behaviors when using the game-theoretic models. Additionally, we will 
argue that values and knowledge can be derived only through an under-
standing of the cultural milieu of the actors. 
To illustrate the argument, we will review the modified assumptions 
suggested by Cohen, indicate the relationship with the building blocks 
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and show how values and knowledge functions may affect actor behavior 
under the modified assumptions. 
Cohen's first assumption is: 
At any given moment there exists for an individual a set 
of events which constitute the possible outcomes of the 
bargaining. The membership of this set may change over 
time. 
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This assumption reflects the building block "event." Cohen argues that 
actors consider only a relatively small set of all the possible outcomes 
that might be available. We shall argue that the set of possible 
outcomes actually under consideration by any actor at any given moment 
is the result of the actor's knowledge. That is, the outcomes which 
compose the actor's set of possible outcomes is based on the actor's 
understanding of or information about the particular bargaining situation. 
As Cohen and Beisecker indicate, the set of possible outcomes may change 
over time as the individual searches for other outcomes or is presented 
with additional outcomes by other parties to the negotiations. 
Cohen's second modified assumption is: 
At any given moment an individual has a value for each event 
currently in the set of possible outcomes. That value may 
change over time. 
This assumption deals specifically with the building olock of utilities 
or values. Central to the question of how the actor views the possible 
outcomes under consideration is the value the individual places on an 
outcome. For example, few Americans today would accept the negotiation 
outcome which would require them to accept a loaf of bread for their watch. 
However, this is precisely the ne~otiation outcome accepted by 
many American soldiers while being held prisoners of war during World 
War II. Other examples, such as the question of cannibalism for sur-
vivors of mountain plane crashes, might be used, but the important 
inference to be drawn here is that the value an individual places 
on a specific outcome is based on that individual's value structure 
at that time, and that the value may change over time and situation. 
Cohen's third modified assumption is: 
At any given moment an individual has some estimate of the 
likelihood of each event currently in the set of possible 
outcomes. That estimate may change over time. 
31 
This modified assumption is directly concerned with the nature of prob-
abilities or utilities. We would argue that the individual's estimate 
of probability or likelihood is heavily influenced by his or her know-
ledge. That is, an individual's perception of the probability of an 
outcome occurring is based upon their knowledge of the situation. In 
certain cases the individual may, as a result of their knowledge, perceive 
that the outcome is one of certainty, risk or uncertainty. The indivi-
duals assessment, however, is made on the basis of their knowledge of the 
situation. As indicated in the modified assumption, an individual's 
estimate of the probability may change over time. This change may result 
from the individual receiving new knowledge or the re-evaluation of old 
knowledge as a result of successful persuasion or strategy on the part 
of the other actor or actors involved in the bargaining. 
Cohen's final modified assumption is: 
At any given moment an individual's estimate, if he has 
one, of the value or likelihood for an event held by an 
opponent may vary in the accuracy with which it approxi-
mates the value or likelihood actually held by that oppon-
ent at that moment. This estimate may change over time. 
The concern here is not with the individual's values or likelihoods, but 
with the individual's estimate of the other actor or actor's values or 
likelihoods. In the context of mixed-motive bargaining it is essential 
to understand the nature of the other actor's values. For example, if one 
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is seriously interested in purchasing a new Cad~llac 9e or she will not 
offer the dealer $1,000 because the individual would know that this would 
not be consistent with the dealer's values. On the other hand, one might 
offer $10,000 (an amount less than the sticker price) if he or she thought 
the dealer would accept this amount. While Cohen allows for the possi-
bility that an individual may not have an estimate of the other actor's 
value or probability for a particular event, it would seem that most 
individuals would develop these estimates for most events. Further, we 
would argue that the accuracy of the estimate, how well it approximates 
the other actor's value or likelihood, will largely be a product of the 
individual's understanding, i.e., knowledge, of the other actor or 
actors. It would seem that the better we understand the other actor or 
actors, the better equipped we will be to make estimates of how they will 
act in response to a given situation. This is the argument that leads 
us to an analysis of the parties in the treaty bargaining. By understanding 
the culture of the actors we will be better able to understand their 
values and-motivations and therefore be in a better position to under-
stand and evaluate the particular search, strategy and persuasion behav-
iors of the parties to the bargaining. 
Culture, History and Values and Knowledge 
An understanding of individuals and societies is best achieved 
through the analysis of the cultural history. This perspective is 
supported by Berkhoffer (1965) in his introduction to Salvation and 
the Savage, when he writes: 
With the concept of culture part of today's culture, the 
modern analyst should be able to understand the past in 
terms of the actors' conception of their situation. While 
the historian can judge the resulting behavior of these 
actions according to his own beliefs, such an evaluation 
frequently distorts the reading of past evidence. Only 
an analysis of the contact situation in terms of parti-
cipants' beliefs wil] meet the cannons of historical 
accuracy. (Intro i-ii) 
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Berkhoffer extends his argument to indicate that it is not enough to 
simply understand the culture of each of the actors, but that it is 
essential to understand the impact of two cultures interacting. As we 
shal] see, the impact of the White contact had a profound influence on 
the position of the Nez Perce by the time of the treaty negotiations 
of 1855. In dealing with the history of the parties to the bargaining, 
we will analyze the actors, especially iu the case of the Nez Perce, 
with the understanding that contact with the White culture plays an 
important part in shaping the culture and values of the actors involved. 
Before turning to the analysis of the bargainers' cultural history, 
we reiterate the necessity for understanding culture in order to under-
stand action of the actors. Berkhoffer considers the irony that some 
authors believe exists between classic American principals and the actual 
treatment of the Indians, and argues that 
... an even greater irony is the failure of these writers 
to see that earlier Americans acted as they did for the 
same reason that the Indians reacted as they did. Both 
groups behaved according to their own cultural systems. 
(p. xvii) 
Recognizing the interaction between culture, values and action, we now 
turn our attention to the cultural milieu of the Nez Perce. 
The Nez Perce Culture 
We will analyze the culture of the Nez Perce nation using Walker's 
Conflict and Schism in Nez Perce Acculturation as the primary source of 
information. This work contains reference to most of the earlier works 
on the Nez Perce nation and adds significant new insights into probable 
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causes of the Nez Perce actions. Walker's work covers the acculturation 
process from the formative first interactions with Euro-American culture 
through the 1960's. Significant to this study is his treatment of the 
first contact period. 
Socia1 Organization of the Nez Perce 
The Nez Perce social system existing prior to direct contact 
with Euro-Americans was relatively simple and heavily influenced by the 
bio-physical environment. Spinden (1908) contends that the climate and 
terrain of the Nez Perce homelands were severe and that the lands "of-
ferred little inducement to the development of primitive agriculture" 
(p. 176). However, he indicates that there were "natural gardens of edible 
roots, game was fairly abundant, and at certain seasons of the year fish 
were plentiful" (p. 176), and that the Nez Perce were dependent upon 
these supplies of food. This relationship to the land would explain, 
at least partially, why the Nez Perce held a high value for the land. 
The lands which the Nez Perce claimed control of were held communally; 
the only private property recognized by the Nez Perce were tools and 
game killed by individual members of the tribe (p. 245). As we shall see 
in Chapter 4, the government was attempting to break the lands into indivi-
dual parcels, which, of course, contradicted the Nez Perce tradition. How-
ever, we shall also see that nearly all of the lands which the Nez Perce 
claimed as their homelands were included in the reservations established in 
the Council. As a result, the Nez Perce were faced with a different form 
of land allotment, but they did keep nearly all of the lands which they 
depended upon for food. This may partially explain why the Nez Perce 
were willing to accept the reservations, even though communal ownership 
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was abolished. Ethnological studies indicate the tribe consisted of 
a number of villages which ranged in population from ten to seventy-
five (Walker, 1968m ii). A Presbyterian missionary, Asa Bowen Smith, 
observes that a census conducted in 1840 found village populations from 
10 to 235 (Drury, 1958, p. 183). Walker, however, thinks that the large 
number was not a single village, but likely a multivillage band. 
The band level of the system includes a number of villages located along 
the same creek or river. Walker suggests that multibands, formed by 
bands in a specific geographic region, were organized for large group 
tasks such as buffalo hunting parties which went to the plains, and for 
offensive and defensive warfare. However, Walker believes there is 
no evidence to indicate that there was any permanent political grouping 
above the band level. Therefore, the concept of a single tribe would 
seem to be alien to the makeup of the Nez Perce people prior to the 
contact with the Euro-Americans. 
Leadership of the village was, in most cases, in the hands of 
the eldest able male. Walker suggests the term headman is the most 
appropriate for this position and the term chief for persons holding multi-
village or multiband leadership. According to Walker, the headman posi-
tion was semi-hereditary, but also based_ on ability. The power of the 
headman was generally derived from the respect of the village, was rela-
tively limited, and extended as long as the governed kept him in respect. 
At the band and multiband level, the chief was given extensive powers 
for the duration of the activity undertaken. Spinden (1908) suggests 
that the Nez Perce multibands had two types of chiefs, war and peace 
(p. 242). Walker (1968) argues that recent evidence would suggest that 
this is somewhat of a misinterpretation. 
Instead there appears to have been two ways to achieve 
chiefly status. There were "mush" and "war" chiefs or 
headmen as the case might be. The "mush" leader, probably 
Spinden's peace chief, gained his position through timely 
distributions of economic goods which gave him a reputation 
as a generous man. He sponsored feasts and tutelary 
spirit dances and ingratiated himself with as many people 
as possible through gifts. 
The question of whether there was a "tribe" and whether there was one 
chief over the tribe becomes critical as we analyze the interactions 
with the Euro-Americans. The distinction between the "mush" chief or 
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headman and the "war" chief or headman is also important. We shall see 
that the "mush" system was used by chiefs appointed by the United States 
government to develop prestige and gain followers. The "mush" chief 
concept also helps to explain why the Nez Perce were so interested in 
Christian religion when they believed it would provide economic goods 
and why they rejected it when it did not provide economic goods. This 
phenomenon will be discussed later. 
First Contact 
It is unknown when Nez Perce people first encountered White 
people. However, a number of events are critical to the development of 
the Nez Perce-Euro-American interactions and resulting changes. The 
first event was the arrival of the horse sometime between 1700 and 1730 
(Josephy, 1965, pp. 28-29). With the arrival of the horse, the Nez 
Perce attained greater mobility, and they were known to have gone to the 
plains to hunt buffalo as early as 1750. 
With these extensive travels, it is likely that the Nez Perce 
encountered White people or gained indirect knowledge of them from visits 
on the plains. Walker (1965) and others suggest that the Nez Perce were 
also affected by other indirect influences, including epidemics (p.32). 
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The Prophet Dance, Walker suggests, resulted from indirect influences. 
Using almost entirely documentary materials, Spier (1935) 
claims to have demonstrated the "aboriginal" existence of 
a cult movement in the Plateau which he calls the Prophet 
Dance. Typically, the Prophet Dance involved a dance, 
usually circular, and an inspired leader who made prophecies 
obtained in visions. Whole settlements participated in the 
ceremony, and a great emphasis was placed on a creator spirit 
or god who reigned above the other spirits. (p. 31) 
This, of course, is a radical departure from the tutelary spirit found 
in the aboriginal period. 
Walker, in his own reaearch, found reference to a tul 0 m cult 
(p. 33). Walker describes the major features of the cult as: 
1. The prediction of the coming of a strange new people 
who would cause great change. 
2. Belief in a book which would provide valuable knowledge. 
3. Belief in a creator and subdeities such as angels. 
4. Observance of a moral code in which charitable actions 
were emphasized. 
5. Belief -:...11. a l1ereafter, entrance to which wa~ determined 
largely by the morality of actions in this world. 
6. Emphasis on dreams, trances, and visits to the land 
of the dead as sources of revelation. 
7. Probably a ritual emphasis on a number seven. 
8. Observation of the sabbath. 
9. Probably a ritual emphasis on cleanliness. 
10. Use of a large pole with flags on it in worship services. 
11. Emphasis on songs and dances as forms of worship. 
12. A new religious leaders status ~priest) specifically 
distinguished from that of the shaman. 
13. Worship ceremonies specifically distinguished from 
the older tutelary spirit dance. The new emphasis 
was on talapo 0 sa, "worship" of a single creator 
God rather than on acquisition and demonstration 
of tutelary spirit power. (p.34) 
Walker thinks it is possible that the cult may have appeared after 
direct contact with the Euro-Americans, but the evidence suggests 
that the cult was active prior to direct contact. One can readily 
see that the cult tenets are similar to the basic teachings of Christianity. 
If cult beliefs were widely accepted among the Nez Perce, this would 
explain the friendly reception given Lewis and Clark in 1805, and also 
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would explain the intense interest expressed in Christian mtssionaries 
and the early acceptance of their teachings. Moreover, it would explain 
the generally favorable attitude to American government policy during 
the course of Nez Perce-government interactions. 
Following the visit of Lewis and Clark, the Nez Perce were nearly 
in constant contact with White people, some Americans and some British. 
The first major influences of the contact came through the fur traders. 
The Hudson's Bay Company operated posts at Vancouver and traders were 
known to have been living in Nez Perce villages as early as 1811. The 
fur traders had an economic impact on the Nez Perce as they traded 
cloth and other goods for furs; and they also had a social impact as 
the Nez Perce observed the religious ceremonies at the trading posts~ 
The Nez Perce expressed definite interest in the Christian 
religion when they sent two of tfieir children to the Red River Mission 
School in Canada in 1830. That the Nez Perce sent children to the school 
stemmed from the return of Spokan Garry (Josephy, pp. 85-89). Garry 
and another Spokane had spent four years at the mission school and 
had returned to their homes in the summer of 1829, having learned the 
English language and having received training in the Bible. Josephy 
argues that the preaching of Garry in the winter of 1829-30 made the 
Nez Perce envious of the new power and influence, and they were more 
than willing to send their children when given the opportunity in the 
sum.mer of 1830. One of the two who returned to their homes in 1833 
apparently did not attain any substantial influence with his people after 
his return (pp. 89-90), but the other, Ellis, became the first "head 
chief" of the Nez Perce in 1842. 
Continued Nez Perce interest in the Christian religion is 
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evidenced by the 1831 pilgrimage to St. Louis by four members of the 
tribe to seek "the book" (pp. 96-98). The arrival of the party at St. 
Louis set off a frenzied response in the American Christian Missionary 
community. 
The first missionary to reach the Nez Perce homeland was Samuel 
Parker who arrived there in December, 1835. The first permanent 
missionary to Nez Perce was Henry Harmon Spalding, arriving at Lapwai 
(now in Idaho) in late November, 1836. Spalding had been accompanied 
on the trip west by Marcus Whitman, another Prebyterian missionary. 
Whitman chose to set up his mission among the Cayuse. Josephy suggests 
the Nez Perce were distressed because the White men were going to 
share the knowledge of the White men's power with the Cayuse (p. 154). 
This is in agreement with our earlier assessment that the Nez Perce saw 
the Christian religion as a source of economic and political power, and, 
as we shall see later, helps to explain the cooperation of some Nez Perce 
during the treaty negotiations. 
The Mission Period 
Spalding continued his mission among the Nez Perce for a period 
of nearly 11 years, departing after the Cayuse killed Marcus Whitman 
and his family in 1847. The relative success and the problems of Spalding 
are important to an understanding of the Nez Perce attitudes at the 
outset of the 1855 proceedings. 
It would seem that Spalding's misunderstanding of Indian 
values and beliefs were standing in the way of his effective mission 
work. Josephy (1965) contends: 
His inability to communicate as well as he wished was .J 
overshadowed by an even more serious deficiency, his lack 
of understanding of the Indians' cultural background and 
habits of thinking. He was more aware than the WHitmans 
were that such a gap existed between the missionary families 
and the Indians, but he had no interest in trying to bridge 
the gulf on the Indian's terms and was intoleFant of native 
beliefs and practices that he did not understand or of which 
he failed to approve. His well meant dedication to uplifting 
of the Nez Perce was often harmed by his sudden outbursts of an-
ger at the Indians who seem to disobey or ignore his directions. 
(p. 161) 
Although Spalding had difficulty in dealing with the Nez Perce, he 
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did attract a few converts to the Christian viewpoint. More importantly, 
these converts were the headmen and chiefs of the villages (Drury, 1958, 
p. 337). 
The question of why the missionaries achieved so little success 
when the Nez Perce had shown such great original interest in Christianity 
is important. The answer would seem to lie in the missionaries' 
misinterpretation of the functions and significance of the Christian 
religion to the Nez Perce. Both perceptions result from differing 
cultures. 
From the Nez Perce viewpoint, having the "book," the Bible, 
was to have the power of God, therefore, supernatural power over the 
environment, resulting in the economic and social success they desired. 
As Asa Bowen Smith, a Presbyterian missionary who spent two years 
(1839-41) among the Nez Perce indicates their striving for economic 
good with this statement: 
They have manifest(ed) a great desire for missionaries, but 
there is no doubt that much of their desire had been 
the hope of temporal gain. Some of this people had 
come in contact with Americans in the mountains from 
when they had received more for their beaver than they 
had from the H.B.C. (Hu<lson's Bay Company) and this 
had raised in them a hope of gain from the missionaries. 
It has been said that they were ready to help missionaries 
and supply their wants. 1t is true that they are when they 
receive a plenty of blankets, shirts, ammunition, etc., for it 
but not very generally without. If we do not pay them well 
for everything they do for us, we very soon are called by 
them a "Stingy chief." (p. 107) 
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Although the missionaries failed to provide many of the economic 
advantages the Nez Perce leaders desired, the missionaries were an 
unwitting ally in changing the system to give the headmen and chiefs 
the social power they wanted. This was achieved through the giving of 
"the laws," which set up the concept of American laws and the concept 
of one chief and one tribe. The laws were the result of an 1842 
Council with Dr. Elijah White, sub-agent for Indian Affairs in Oregon. 
Although the United States had not taken claim to the Nez Perce country, 
White acted* as if he were the ultimate authority and issued a set of 
"laws" to an assembled body of 22 headmen of the Nez Perce and Cayuse 
tribes (Allen, 1850, p. 181). The laws were 
1. Whoever wilfully takes life shall be hanged. 
2. Whoever burns a dwelling house shall be hung. 
3. Whoever burns an outbuilding shall be imprisoned six 
months, receive fifty lashes, and pay all damages. 
4. Whoever carelessly burns a house, or any property, 
shall pay damages. 
5. If anyone enter a dwelling, without the permission of the 
occupant, the chiefs shall punish him as they think 
proper. Public rooms exc~pted. 
6. If any one steals he shall pay back twofold; and if it 
be the value of a beaver skin or less, he shall receive 
twenty-five lashes; and if the value is over a beaver 
skin he shall pay back twofold and receive fifty lashes. 
7. If any one takes a horse, and ride it, without permission, 
or takes any article and uses it, without liberty, he shall 
*It must be understood that White, although appointed by the United States 
government, was on very questionable legal ground. The land mass on which 
Oregon was located was still being claimed by the United States and Great 
Britain. The matter was not resolved until the United States-Canada, 
border was established at the 49th parallel in the compromise of 1846. 
The situation that triggered White's appearence~in the Nez Perce country 
was an unidentified Indian entering t:ne bed:;oom of Narcissa Whitman, 
wife of Marcus Whitman, while Marcus was travelling to Boston. Mrs. 
Whitman scared off the intruder, but was moved to the safety of Fort 
Walla Walla. After she lefS t~e mission was burned. 
pay for the use of it, and receive from twenty to fifty 
lashes, as the chief shall direct. 
8. If anyone enters a field, and injures the crops, or throw 
down the fence, so that cattle or horses go in and 
damage, he shall pay all damages, and receive twenty-five 
lashes for every offense. 
9. Those only may keep dogs who travel or live among the game; 
if a dog kills a lamb, calf, or any domestic animal, the 
owner shall pay the damage and kill the dog. 
10. If an Indian raises a gun or other weapon against a white 
man, it shall be reported to the chiefs, and they shall 
punish him. If a white person does the same to an Indian 
it shall be reported to Dr. White, and he shall redress it. 
11. If an Indian breaks these laws, he shall be punished by 
his chiefs; if a white man breaks them, he shall be reported 
to the agent, and be punished in this instance. (pp. 189-190) 
After giving the laws, White directed the headmen to select 
a "high chief of the tribe, and acknowledge him as such by universal 
consent" (Josephy, 1965, p. 230). After some difficulty, but at 
the insistence of Dr. White, the assembled headmen finally chose 
Ellis, the boy who had been sent to the Red River School. Although 
he was the grandson of Hohots Ilpilp, the oldest and one of the most 
respected of the headmen at the Council, Ellis violated most of the 
Nez Perce customs of leadership. He was probably under thirty years 
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of age, and he was not noted for his leadership in hunting or warfare. 
The only claim was the semi-hereditary nature of leadership, and that 
was only for the village level. The most probable reason that he was 
chosen, as Josephy (1965) argues, was that he had Christian education 
and that he could read and write the English language (p. 231).* 
Although Lawyer was jealous of the position given to Ellis, he accepted 
*Josephy states on p. 88 that all of the young men who went to the 
Red River School in 1830 were 12 to 17 years of age. Yet, he gives 
the age of\Eil:i'.1s)at 32 in 1842. Obviously, there appears to be an 
inconsistency of facts, but this should not overshadow the understanding 
that Ellis was comparatively young--that he did not have the 
age that would normally be expected for a leader of the Nez Perce 
bands. 
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the system, and on Ellis' death in the buffalo country in 1847, Lawyer be-
came "chief 11 of the Nez Perce and was the leader of the Nez Perce in 
the 1855 negotiations. 
There is little evidence to indicate that the Nez Perce did 
not widely accept the laws. However, the Cayuse did not like the laws 
or the manner in which they were given. They began to react against 
the laws and the council almost immediately, leading to unrest. 
Narcissa Whitman outlined the root of the problem in a letter to her 
husband: 
[The reason] 1s the Kayuses do not wish to be forced to 
adopt the laws. They say the laws in themselves are good, 
they do not object to them--but do not wish to be compelled 
to adopt them (enforce them). This arises from what was 
said at the meeting to this effect: We advise you to 
adopt these laws, but if you do not we will put you in 
a way to do it. They took exception to such language 
as this. Call it threatening them--and are jealous and 
complain of Ellis--the High Chief and the Nez Perces 
for so soon and readily entering into new measures of 
the Americans. (p. 235) 
The Cayuse continued their opposition and their opposition culminated 
in 1847 when a portion of the tribe killed missionary Marcus Whitman, 
his family and a number of other Whites. These killings caused Spalding 
to halt his work among the Nez Perce.* 
From the time of the Whitman murders until the treaty bargaining 
of 1855, little missionary activity took place in the region. The 
headmen of the Nez Perce, especially Lawyer, continued to maintain 
friendly relations with the Whites. He served as intermediary and 
sent men to help in the capture of the Cayuse who were responsible 
for the murders of the Whitmans. Under the influence of Lawyer, the 
* For additional detail, see Josephy (1965), pp. 248-257. 
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Nez Perce continued to practice the tenets of the Christian religion, 
and they adopted many of the agricultural techniques and practices 
taught by Spalding. As a result they prospered economically and gained 
additional prestige among the various bands. However, there is 
evidence to indicate that the Nez Perce were wary of the plans of the 
Whites in regard to their lands. Josephy indicates the nature of the 
relationship with this statement about the 1851 visit of Anson Dart, Oregon 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs: 
... (Dart) then went on to Lapwai, where some four 
hundred Nez Perce leaders and warriors, including Joseph 
and a group from the Wallowa, came riding in with a proud 
show of strength, beating drums, whooping, firing 
their guns, and, finally putting on a huge war dance. 
When the Nez Perce learned that Dart had no idea of 
proposing that they give up any of their lands, their 
defensiveness vanished and they convinced him that 
they intended to remain friendly to the Americans. (p. 290) 
Thus, as we move toward the 1855 treaty negotiations we can 
see that an influential segment of the Nez Perce people, especially 
headmen and chiefs, were influenced by a distorted view of the 
Christian religion, and that the general feeling toward the Whites 
was one of friendship, but with a substantial amount of uncertainty 
about the events to come. This uncertainty was not unwarranted when 
we look at how the United States Indian policy for the Northwest was 
developed. 
United States Indian Policy in the Northwest 
United States government policy toward the Indians of the 
Northwest, which includes the Nez Perce, was a product of American 
history and uhe events of the time. From the beginning of the White-
Indian contact the policy had not been one of integration, but one of 
segregation. The major legislative act establishing a precedent for 
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the policies which were to be used in the Northwest were the Indian Trade 
and Intercourse Acts of 1834. Prucha (1962) argues that the act was 
formulated on the following principles. 
1. Protection of the Indian right to their lands by setting 
boundaries for the Indian Country, restricting Whites 
from entering the areas except under certain controls, 
and removing illegal intruders. 
2. Control of the disposition of Indian lands by denying 
the right of private individuals or local government to 
acquire land from the Indians by purchase or by another 
means. 
3. Regulation of the Indian trade by determining the condi-
tions under which individuals might engage in the trade, 
prohibiting certain classes of traders, and actually 
entering into trade itself. 
4. Control of the liquor traffic by regulating the flow of 
intoxicating liquor into the Indian Country and then 
prohibiting it all together. 
5. Provision for the punishment of crimes committed by 
members of one race against the other and compensation 
for damages suffered by one group at the hands of the 
other, in order to remove the occasions for private 
retaliation which led to frontier hostilities. 
6. Promotion of civiltzation and education among the Indians 
in hope that they might be absorbed into the general 
stream of American society. (p. 2) 
These principles were evident in the thinking of the 1850's 
statement by Michigan Agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft: 
Whatever defects may, in the eyes of the most ardent 
philanthropists, have at any time marked our system 
of Indian policy, nothing should, for a moment, 
divert the government or people, in their appropriate 
spheres, from offering to these wandering and benighted 
branches of the human race, however often rejected by 
them, the gifts of education, agriculture and the 
gospel. There is one boon, beside which their ignorance 
and instability, and want of business and legal fore-
sight, requires, in their present and future state--
it is protection. (Schoolcraft in Pearce (1965), p. 241) 
There is little question that the ultimate consideration of 
government policy was to provide lands for the Whites where they 
could expect relatively peaceful conditions. As the policies 
indicate, one of the ways to achieve this was to "Christianize" 
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the Indians and have them adopt an agriculturally based, rather than a 
hunter-gatherer based subsistence. In this way the Indians could be 
placed in restricted areas and the remainder of the land would be 
open for White settlement. 
Underlying the policy of separation is an understanding 
that White-Indian integra\ion nearly always led to conflict, and while 
the separation policy could be supported as a means of protecting the 
Indians, it was also a method whereby Whites could be protected. 
As we consider the specific policies of the Oregon territory* 
it is essential to understand that official government policy was not 
supported by all Americans--especially those on the frontier. The position 
is well illustrated by Prucha (1965) when he writes: 
Behind the laws on the statute books there were deep run-
ning and divergent currents of thought about the character 
of the Indians and his rights. One of these currents was 
represented by official government policy; it found expres-
sion in the laws passed by Congress, which in large part 
followed the recommendations and reports of the uresidents, 
the secretaries of war, and other executive officials in 
the directive and regulations issued by the War Department 
and in the decisions of the courts. The other was the 
frontiersmen's position, a popular attitude of hostility 
toward the red man, which spurred the ruthless drive 
against the Indians and made it impossible for the 
government to carry out its policy with anything like 
complete effect. (p. 3) 
In the case of Oregon this is important for three reasons: 
1) Oregon was nearly 3,000 miles from the power which resided in 
Washington, D. C.; 2) the Oregon Territory was under dispute between 
Great Britain and the United States until 1846, and as a result the 
*The territory which composed the Oregon Territory in 1848 included 
all of the lands now included in the states of Oregon, Washington and 
Idaho. Washington Territory was established out of the Oregon Terri-
tory in 1853. Idaho did not become a state until 1890. 
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territory was not established until 1848, and the territorial govern-
ment until 1849; and 3) several thousand White settlers were in the 
territory developing farms, homes and villages by the time the govern-
ment and its legal authority were established. 
The Nez Perce-White contact was somewhat limited because of their 
remoteness, and the lesser desireability of their lands for agricultural 
purposes. As a result, the first governmental interactions with 
the Indians were held with the coastal tribes. These interactions 
were to reflect the general policy toward all Indians in the Oregon 
Territory. 
The Oregon Territory Indian Policy 
Following the establishment of the Oregon Territory, the 
American Indian policy was in a state of flux. One year after the 
territory was established by Congress, the Commissioners of Indian 
Affairs office was transferred from the War Department to the Interior 
Department. Responsibility for Indian Affairs in Oregon moved from 
office to office in quick succession. 
From 1848 to 1853 several treaties were negotiated with the 
coastal tribes; however, none of the treaties were approved by the 
Senate, because policy was not clearly established and many of the 
western senators supported removal of the Indians, while the treaties 
allowed the Indians to remain on portions of the lands to which they 
claimed title.* It was not until the appointment of Joel Palmer in 
1853 that a coherent policy was developed. 
With the appointment of Palmer, a new day in Indian-White relations 
*For a thorough discussion of this period, see Coan, 1921 and 1922) 
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was about to dawn for the Oregon and Washington* territories. Palmer, 
who had arrived in Oregon in 1845, understood the nature of the situation. 
This understanding is illustrated by his report to the Commissioners of 
Indian Affairs in June, 1853, outlining the conditions of the Indians 
of the Willamette Valley. He argued that the conditions were the result of 
... the nonratification of treaties, which had been 
made with them; the belief among the Indians that the 
treaties would not be ratified until they had wasted away; 
the settling of the lands which the Indians claimed under 
the treaties; the decrease in the supply of roots and 
game due to the increasing stettlements; and the pauperi-
zation of the Indians by unprincipled Whites. (Coan, 1922, 
pp. 1-2) 
In a report to the Commissioner on June 23, 1853, Palmer argued 
that the Dart policy of reservations which allowed the Indians to mingle 
with the Whites would lead to the extermination of the Indians. Palmer 
suggested, however, that the reservation system be adopted, but that 
certain safeguards were essential to protect the Indians. These safe-
guards were 
... a home remote from the settlements; laws guarding 
them from degraded Whites; laws governing the Indians 
in their relations with one another; and the aid of 
schools, missionaries, and instruction in agriculture. 
(p. 4) 
Thus, Palmer returned to the classic American position that the Indians 
needed to be protected, and that they needed to be "civilized." The 
new policy for Oregon was, in effect, guided by the old policy of the 
1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts. 
*Congress created Washington Territory on March 2, 1853, and included 
the northern portion of the old Oregon Territory. Washington Territory 
boundaries were the 46th parallel on the south, the 49th parallel on the 
north, the main ridge of the Rocky Mountains on the east and the 
Pacific Ocean on the west. As a result of these boundaries, the lands 
normally considered the Nez Perce homelands now fell in Oregon and 
Washington Territories. 
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Palmer received the support of the Commissioner, who following 
receipt of Palmer's 1853 report, urged Congress to authorize the speedy 
making of treaties with the Indians of the Oregon and Washington terri-
tories, including those east of the Cascades. The action was necessary, 
according to the Commissioner because 
••• the lands of the Indians were being taken by whites; 
because the government had encouraged the settlement of 
the region; because the prosperity of the country was 
delayed by the uncertainty of peace; because an extensive 
outbreak was probable unless the Indians were pacified; 
because hostilities were caused by the absence of treaties; 
and because it is desirable that there be peace with the 
Indians along the route of the railroad projects. (p. 6) 
On July 31, 1854, Congress authorized the making of treaties 
and appropriated $68,000 for the expenses of the treaty-making sessions 
and the first installment of annuities in Oregon and $45,000 for 
Washington. Although the Congress authorized the treaties and the funds 
for consumating them, they did not determine what policy was to be 
followed, and thus Palmer and I. I. Stevens, territorial governor for 
Washington, had substantial freedom. Coan argues, therefore, the fact 
that the Indian policy adopted for Washington was the same as O~egon 
was not due to government policy, but due to the fact that Palmer and 
Stevens were of the same mind on how to handle Indian affairs (p.9). 
Stevens was given responsibility for Indian affairs because as 
Governor he was ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs. Stevens 
also was the leader of the survey team that was mapping the route of the 
Great Northern Railroad. As he moved west with the §urvey team in 1853, 
he met with several of the tribes with which he was to work. His major 
problem was the intrusion of Whites into the Washington Territory. The 
Whites were moving into the territory and settling on land which the 
Indians had not yet sold. This caused Indian-White tensions to remain 
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high during the period. The settlers were within the 1850 Donation Act 
passed by Congress, which allowed the settler title to land without regard 
to Indian claims. Thus, Stevens' first concern was to gain title to the 
land through treaty with the Indians. The 1854 Congressional action 
provided him with the powers and resources to complete the work. 
Although Palmer had begun making treaties with a few small tribes 
before the Act of 1854, the Act set in force a maJor program to deal 
with all of the tribes and set forth a unified Indian Affairs program. 
Because the Nez Perce homelands, along with those of the Cayuse, Walla 
Wallas, Spokane, Yakimas and a number of lesser bands included areas 
in Washington and Oregon, Palmer and Stevens met jointly with these tribes. 
The treaty, which will be analyzed in the following chapter is commonly 
referred to as the Treaty of Walla Walla. Before directing attention 
to the treaty bargaining, it is useful to review the values and knowledge 
held by the negotiators at the outset of the sessions. 
Values and Knowledge of the Parties 
From the data examined earlier, one can argue that there was a 
good deal of White-Indian interaction prior to the treaty bargaining 
and that both parties had substantial information about the other's 
values. The amount of information and the accuracy of that information 
is not totally certain. For example, Stevens, upon being appointed 
Governor, was told by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the infor-
mation in the hands of the Bureau, relative to the Indians of the North-
west, was of little value and that he (Stevens) should seek all the infor-
mation he could from the tribes as he met with them (p. 11). However, 
the available evidence allows for the development of a rather comprehen-
sive assessment of the values and knowledge held by the parties. 
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Although there were other Indian groups which were parties to 
the bargaining of the 1855 treaty, we will limit our analysis to the Nez 
Perce and indicate divergent values and knowledge of other parties 
when the analysis requires. 
The Nez Perce Values and Knowledge 
Central to the value structures of the Nez Perce was their 
relationship with the land. Traditionally a hunter-gatherer society, the 
Nez Perce who did not accept modern agricultural practices espoused 
by the missionaries were directly dependent on the land for their subsis-
tence. For those Nez Perce who had accepted the agricultural practices, 
the land was somewhat less important in that they did not need the free 
access to the natural room and grazing fields for their subsistence. 
However, all of the Nez Perce were to a lesser or greater degree depend-
ent upon the land for their livelihood--the only question was how much 
and which land did they need. 
Another Nez Perce value to consider is the Christian religion. 
We have argued that the Nez Perce leaders sought the Christian religion 
as a source of economic and political power which could be used to 
maintain their role within their tribe and other tribes in the region. 
While this purpose might be considered a distortion of Christianity 
in current thinking, it does not change the fact that the leaders 
believed the Christian religion would give them power. If we can 
accept this argument, then it is plausible to argue that the leaders 
wished to maintain good relations with the Whites who were the source 
of the teachings. 
Although one might add more segments to the Nez Perce value 
structure, the above would seem to encompass the critical elements as 
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they entered into the 1855 negotiations. Therefore, we now turn our 
attention to the knowledge which the Nez Perce may have had at the outset 
of the negotiations. 
The Nez Perce were likely aware of the desire of the Whites to 
take their lands. This knowledge came from three sources. The first 
was the continuing stream of settlers whi~h were entering the territory; 
the second was the treaties which had been negotiated with the tribes of 
the coastal region; and the third was the tribes east of the Rocky Mountains. 
The Nez Perce watched many of the settlers cross over the mountains into 
Oregon and thus were aware of the migration. Evidence indicates that 
tribes exchanged information during various travels and rendezvous, 
so it is doubtful that the Nez Perce were not aware of the program of 
Palmer and Stevens--a program of land buying and reservations. 
Projected Impact on Nez Perce Communication 
We have argued earlier that the values and knowledge held by 
individuals will be reflected in their communication behaviors even if 
they are not explicitly aware of their values and knowledge at a 
given moment. This leads us to the question of what impact the values 
and knowledge of the Nez Perce would have on their communication in the 
Council sessions. Because the Nez Perce valued their lands so highly, 
we would expect them to develop a strategy of communication that 
would allow them to maintain the greatest land mass possible. In this 
regard, we would expect them to oppose government offers which would 
seek to restrict their holdings. We would also expect them to make 
demands for greater land holdings. However, we would expect that the 
Nez Perce communication would also be somewhat conciliatory, in that the 
Nez Perce knew of the government's superior military power and the 
Nez Perce desire to keep good relations with those of the Christian 
faith. 
Knowledge of the Other Indians 
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The major concern of this study is with the behavior of the Nez 
Perce during the Council, but it is important to illustrate the knowledge 
which the other tribes probably had at the opening of the bargaining. 
We will argue that the other tribes knew that the government wanted 
their lands, that they knew how the government was attempting to take 
other lands in the region, that they knew how the government had kept 
previous treaty commitments, and that they were ambivalent concerning 
their ability to resist the continued encroachment of the Whites onto 
their lands if the treaty was not negotiated" 
No doubt the other tribes, mainly the Yakimas, Walla Wallas, 
Cayuse and Umatillas, knew that the government wanted their lands 
for settlement and that this was the purpose of the Council. Coan 
(1921) indicated that the government had been holding councils with 
the Indians since 1846, attempting to establish land title in the 
region. In 1851 Indian Agent Anson Dart had met with the Shoshonis 
and the Nez Perce and the subject of moving the coastal tribes to the 
interior was broached. Both tribes reJected the idea, and Dart 
returned to the coast and negotiated 13 treaties which allowed the 
coastal tribes to remain 0n portions of the lands they originally 
held. These treaties, however, were not approved by the Senate in 
1853, and it is believed that they were reJected because they ran 
counter the policy of removal supported by Oregon Senator Thurston 
(pp. 58-65). Josephy (1965) also argues that Kamiakin was busy during 
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the summer of 1854 keeping other tribes apprised of the activities 
of the government,negotiators as they met with the tribes of the coastal 
region (p. 313). The record indicates that the government negotiated 
treaties with three minor tribes along the coast on March 8, 1855, 
and these treaties called for the ceding of lands to the government 
(Coan, 1921, p. 66). Although the evidence is not directly stated, 
we believe that the Indians also had an understanding of government 
policy from their trips to the plains for rendezvous and buffalo hunting 
and in their relationship with Jim Simonds, a Delaware Indian known as 
"Delaware Jim." He lived with the Nez Perce from about 1849 until 
the beginning of the Council (Jospehy, 1965, p. 321). Inasmuch as 
he had come from the East Coast, it is doubtful that he would not have 
known about the treatment of the Indians in that region. 
Whether the other Indians believed they could prevent the further 
intrusion of Whites into their country is not totally certain. In 1849 
the Cayuse met with Joseph Lane, then Indian Agent for Oregon, and were 
told to ~surrender those guilty of the Whitman Massacre, or be extermin-
ated" (Coan, 1921, p. 50). The Cauyse did turn in those responsible in 
1850, and Coan (1921) suggests that this was due to a greater American 
military presence (p. 51). However, in 1854 there were a number of 
incidents where the Indians had responded to attacks on them, and several 
Whites were killed. Coan (1922) suggests that the Indian responses were 
due to the failure of the government to punish the guilty parties 
and "the failure of the military department to inspire the Indians 
with sufficient fear of the Americans, to pr~vent attacks (p. 3). 
From the evidence, it would seem that the Indians understood the power 
of the American military establishment, but also they believed they 
could defend themselves against White intrusion and abuse. 
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The Impact on Other Indians' Communication 
Based upon what we believe to be the knowledge held by the other 
tribes at the outset of the Council, we would expect the other tribes 
to develop a strategy that would attempt to prevent the sale of their 
lands. We would also expect the tribes to be somewhat forceful in 
their demands, in that they may have believed they could, if united, 
stop the encroachment of the Whites. Also, we would expect that the tribes 
would question the veracity of the offers and the procedures, inasmuch 
as other treaties had not been approved, and when they were approved 
many of the commitments had not been met, especially in the case of the 
Eastern tribes. We shall test these assertions in the following chapter. 
Relationships Between the Tribes 
Another element which may have had an impact on the outcome of 
the negotiations was the relationships between the various tribes at 
the Council. The evidence would indicate that the tribes were not united. 
Josephy (1965) argues that Kamiakin was leading the forces which 
would attempt war against the Whites, but that the chiefs who were 
influenced by Christianity were generally opposed to war talk (p. 313). 
Notable among the chiefs influenced by Christianity were Lawyer, Stickus 
of the Cayuse and Spokan Garry, even though his tribe was not directly 
affected by the Council. 
The transcript of the proceedings also indicates that Lawyer 
refused to meet with the other chiefs prior to the opening of the 
Council. The specific incident will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four. Our analysis will show that Lawyer continued to be supportive 
of the government during the course of the Council, and that Stevens 
used Lawyer's acceptance of the treaty as a weapon against the 
other tribes as he attempted to force them to accept the government 
offer. 
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From the evidence we have gathered, it would seem that the bulk 
of the other tribes were generally opposed to the treaty, but the Nez 
Perce seemed willing to accept the offers. As we have noted, Stevens 
believed that the continued support of the Nez Perce was instrumental 
in making the treaty possible. Although we believe there is some 
merit in Stevens position, we shall argue, in Chater Four, that is 
was not the Nez Perce support, alone, that made the consumation of 
the treaty possible, and that the other tribes accepted the offer of 
the third reservation even after the Nez Perce under Looking Glass 
wavered in their support. 
We can only speculate what would have happened if all of the 
tribes had been united against the treaty. Our instincts are that 
the treaty would have been much harder to achieve, if at all. 
Palmer and Stevens' Values and Knowledge 
Central to the value structure here was the opening of the lands 
for White settlement. We may look upon this aspect of the structure as 
being non-negotiable. That is, a good deal of territory was going to be 
opened for settlement by the Whites. 
Closely related to the opening of the land was the position that 
the territory should pe tranquil so that the Whites would not be afraid 
to move into the territory, and that those in the territory would be free 
to prosper and develop the area. To assure this, it was held that 
the title to the Indian lands must be extinguished and the Indians 
placed on reservations where there would be limited and regulated 
57 
Indian-White contact. This policy grew out of the belief that unlimited 
and unregulated contact would result in the Indians suffering at 
the hands of the Whites and that this would inevitably lead to conflict. 
Although Palmer and Stevens supported the policy that the Indians 
srould be protected through the reservatien system, it seems apparent 
that their overriding value was to open the land to Whites, and that if 
necessary military action would be taken to carry out this value. 
Perhaps the most important piece of knowledge in the hands of 
the negotiators was their belief that they held the ultimate military 
power to enforce their will. The trade-offs they were making were to 
preven~ bloodshed, if possible, while still gaining their objective of 
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opening the territory for settlement. Throughout the course of the 
negotiations Palmer and Stevens acted from a position of ultimate 
authority. 
The evidence indicates that the government negotiators were only 
partially sensitive to the Nez Perce relation to the land. While under-
standing the need for crop and grazing lands, they were not totally 
sensitive to the need for free movement to ~ather roots and other foods. 
Obviously, Palmer and Stevens vere operating from the perspective of 
European agriculture, rather than from the perspective of the hunter-
gatherer perspective. 
A final piece of information which the negotiators well under-
stood was the continuing migration of the Whites, especially into the 
Oregon and Washington territories. They knew this flood was going to 
continue and that the possibilities for hostilities would grow with 
the increasing competition for the finite lands. 
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The Impact of Government Knowledge and Values 
We have indicated that we believe the values and knowledge of 
the Nez Perce leaders would have an impact on their communication behav-
iors in Council. We believe this will also be true of the government 
negotiators. While the government negotiators were not as personally 
affected by the outcome of the Council as the Indian leaders, they did 
operate with a set of knowledge and values. Because of the government's 
high utility for opening large areas of land for White settlement, we 
would expect their communication strategies to focus on the develop-
ment of treaties which forced the Indians to relinquish title to large 
areas of land. However, because of the government's concern for a 
tranquil setting for settlement, we would also expect the government 
negotiators to emphasize a peaceful settlement of the issue in 
their communication strategies. Also, the belief on the part of the 
government negotiators that they were in a position of ulitimate 
power would lead us to predict that their communication behaviors 
would be based on a power relationship. 
We shall test these predictions as we analyze the Council in 
the next chapter. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
This chapter provides an analysis of the negotiations between 
the United States Government and the Nez Perce and other Indian tribes 
at the Treaty Council of Walla Walla, Washington Territory from May 29 
through June 11, 1855. We shall first analyze the bias and quality 
of the Council transcript. Second, we shall review what we believe to 
have been the negotiating parties' perceptions of events, probabilities 
and utilities. Third, we shall analyze the transcript using the perspective 
of the Beisecker model to analyze the communication strategies and 
the perspective of the Cohen model of search, strategy and persuasion 
to analyze how-the negotiations unfolded. Fourth, the chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the relative successes of the participants. 
The Council Record 
For this analysis, the Slickpoo and Walker (1974, pp. 87-141) 
transcript of the Proceedings of the Council held at Camp Stevens, 
Walla Walla Valley, will be used. The Slickpoo transcript is taken from 
a microfilm of the original handwritten transcript in the archives of 
the Office of the Indian Bureau. The shortcomings to this transcript 
shall be reviewed below. 
A major consideration is that the record is the White record. 
Therefore, we would anticipate that it would be ethnocentric and any 
deliberate changes in the record would likely have been made to place 
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the White negotiators in a positive light. Unfortunately, this is the 
only extant transcript of the Council bargaining sessions. A record of 
the proceedings was kept by Timothy, one of the Nez Perce Chiefs, but 
that record was burned following his death in 1890 (Drury, 1979, p. 102). 
The transcript was prepared in the field from shorthand notes 
(p. 102) by James Doty, Secretary for the Washington Territory and William 
McCoy, Secretary for the Oregon Territory. Each secretary under the 
C 
direction of their respective governors, was to keep a verbatim record. 
However, only one jointly prepared transcript was sent to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs. The transcript was signed by both governors. Obviously, 
this allows for the possibility of editing on the part of either or both 
secretaries and either or both governors. Because the original tran-
script was taken in shorthand, there is a possibility that the notes were 
not accurately transcribed. However, these types of errors are probably 
minimal since the official record for June 7 closely parallels a 
contemporary record of that day kept by Kip (1899, pp. 18-22). Kip's 
record of the statements of the governors is nearly identical to the 
official version. 
The most damaging problem of the transcript is the record of the 
interpreters at the Council. The transcript lists four persons--Wm. 
Craig, N. Raymond, Leaufoher, and John Flette--as interpreters in the 
list of officials for the Council. In the minutes of the proceedings 
only Craig, of the original four is named. However, McDauphin, Delaware 
Jim, Pembrom, Olney and John Whitford are added (McWhorter, p. 23). 
The Stevens record does not totally agree with the official record. It 
indicates William Craig, N. Raymond, Matthew Danpher and John Flette 
were named as the interpreters and officers of the Council (Stevens, 
1900, pp. 32-33). The only disagreement here is in the case of Danpher 
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and Leaufoher. Inasmuch as the two names have similar endings, this 
may be a case of poor transcription. Stevens also indicates that addi-
tional interpreters were named. They were A. D. Pambrun, John Whitford, 
James Coxie and Patrick McKenzie (pp. 32-33). The only total agreement 
is on John Whitford, but it is likely that Pembrom and Pembrun are the 
same person. 
Although there is considerable discrepancy in the names of the 
persons appointed as interpreters, the records are in agreement in 
showing that each of the major tribal groups had at least one person who 
could speak their language. They are William Craig for the Nez Perce, 
A. D. Pambrun for the Cayuse and John Whitford for the Walla Wallas and 
Yakimas. William Craig was a trapper who had been living in the Nez Perce 
country since 1829 and was trusted by most of the Nez Perce. He served 
as the interpreter for the Nez Perce and continued to live among the Nez 
Perce following the Council. A. D. Pambrun was a resident of Fort Walla 
Walla (Josephy, 1965, p. 308). John Whitford was appointed to the group 
of interpreters following a meeting between the governors and Peopeo 
Moxmox of the Walla Wallas at which Moxmox is quoted as saying, "I want 
more than one interpreter at the Council, that we may know they translate 
truly" (McWhorter, p. 26). The statement by Peopeo Moxmox would indicate 
that the Indians were aware of the problems of interpretation and that 
the additional interpreters appointed by the governors would suggest 
that the Indians probably got a reasonably accurate interpretation. 
The actual procedure for interpretation used was outlined by 
Kip in his journal: 
As he (Stevens) finished each sentence, the interpreter 
repeated it to two of the Indians who announced it in a 
loud voice to the rest--one in the Nez Perce and the other 
in the Walla Walla language. This process necessarily 
causes the business to move slowly (Kip, 1897, p. 15). 
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Another significant problem in using the official transcript is 
. 
that not all of the bargaining is included in the transcript. This, results 
not from any fault of the transcription or record keeping, but from the 
fact that Stevens and Palmer held meetings (considered unofficial) with 
the various Indian leaders outside the official Council (Stevens, 1900, 
p. 53, and Kip, 1899, p. 27). During our discussion of the Council 
proceedings we will interject, where possible, information pertaining to 
the outside meetings and indicate their effect on the Council. 
Although we recognize the problems of White bias, possible tran-
scription problems, possible editing, inconsistency in names of the 
interpreters and communication outside of the Council sessions, we still 
believe that the transcript is adequate for this study. We must remember 
that the purpose of this study is to examine the processes through which 
the decisions of the Council were reached. To the extent that the record 
is inadequate, incomplete, or incorrect, the ultimate conclusions of fact 
will be inadequate. However, the analysis of the process may not be 
affected. And, if we can analyze and understand the processes we have 
substantially fulfilled our goal. 
The Council Organized 
We now turn our attention to the organization of the Council. 
The Council, as we have indicated earlier, was an outgrowth of the United 
States Government Indian policy which called for the extinguishing of 
Indian land titles through purchase and the movement of the tribes to 
reservations. 
During late 1854 and early 1855 Governor Stevens instructed his 
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secretary, James Doty, to meet with the various tribes east of the 
Cascades to arrange a council. Doty completed his work in early 1855, 
and Stevens then informed Governor Palmer. Governor Palmer was brought 
into the treaty process because the Nez Perce, Walla Wallas and Cayuse 
had lands in both Washington and Oregon, so both governors had to agree 
to make the treaties. The site in the Walla Walla Valley was chosen 
becuase it was the traditional council ground of the Indian tribes of 
the area (Drury, 1979, p. 91). 
Preparations were made for the Council be the joint offices of 
the governors and included gifts for the Indians after the treaty was 
signed and a supply of food which was to be offered to the Indians during 
the Council. May 20 was set_as the opening day of the Council, but 
the officers did not arrive until May 21. The Nez Perce arrived at 
the Council grounds on May 23, the Cayuse on May 25, and the Walla Wallas 
and Yakimas on May 27 (McWhorter, p. 19). It was estimated that there 
were 5,000 Indians present, of which 2,500 were believed to be Nez 
Perce. The Cayuse, Walla Wallas and Yakimas constituted the largest 
numbers of the remaining Indians, with a few minor tribes represented. 
The official record estimates the total population of the Yakimas to 
be 2,000 (p. 13), the Walla Wallas to be 800 and the Cayuse, including 
the Umatilla bands, to be 800 (p. 18). 
Although there were many Indians at the Council, the deliberations 
were left to the major chiefs. Peopeo Moxmox of the Walla Wallas 
demanded, prior to the opening of the Council, that he, along with 
Young Chief of the Cayuse, Kamiakin of the Yakimas and Lawyer of the 
Nez Perce do all of the talking for the Indians (Josephy, 1965, p. 317). 
This request was generally respected, except for minor comments. 
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Both were signs of less than friendly attitudes. Stevens indicated, 
however, that Peopeo Moxmox had been generally.well disposed to the 
Whites, despite the fact that his son had been killed by Whites in 
California some years earlier. Stevens believed that Peopeo Moxmox 
was still bitter about the incident (p. 36). Young Chief, a brother-
in-law of Peopeo Moxmox, met with Stevens upon arrival, but dismounted 
his horse "with evident reluctance, and shook hands in a very cold 
manner" (p. 38). Stevens was led to further suspect the three tribes 
when Fathers Chirouse of the Walla Walla and Pandosy of the Yakima 
Missions arrived and said the Indians were generally well disposed 
toward the Whites, with the exception of Kamiakin (p. 37). It was 
also reported that the Cayuse, Walla Wallas and Yakimas attempted to 
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persuade the Nez Perce to reject the provisions, but failed in this 
' 
attempt. Rumors floated that the three tribes were combining to 
resist the treaty and that the opening of the Council would be the 
signal to start an outbreak (p. 38). 
On May 28, the day prior to the,opening of the Council, 
Stevens and Palmer met with Lawyer in his tent, he being unable to 
walk because an old gunshot wound had broken open. Lawyer explained 
a map of the Nez Perce country, and during this explanation several 
lesser Nez Perce chiefs entered and reported that the Cayuse wanted 
the Nez Perce to meet with the Cayuse and Peopeo Moxmox. Lawyer 
rebuffed them, reading from a book which he said he had been given 
by Chief Ellis. Part of the passage allegedly read by Lawyer said: 
Whenever the Great Cheif of the Americans shall come into 
your country to give you laws, accept them! The Walla Wallas 
heart is a Walla Wallas; a Cayuse heart is a Cayuses; so is a 
Yakimas heart a Yakimas; a Nez Perces heart is a Nez Perces 
heart; but they have all received the White law. They are all 
going straight, yes! While the Nez Perces are going straight, 
why should they turn aside to follow others who are going 
straight. (McWhorter, p. 24) 
66 
Lawyer concluded, saying, "Ellis' advice is to accept the White law. 
I have read it to you to show my heart" (p. 24). 
Stevens prepared for the opening of the Council with the belief 
that he had the support of the Nez Perce and their leader, Lawyer, while 
being viewed with suspicion and anger by the other major tribes and 
their leaders. 
Events, Probabilities and Utilities 
We have argued that events, probabilities and utilities form 
the building blocks of the game theory orientation. Under Cohen's 
modified assumptions of the theory, events are those possible outcomes 
that an individual is considering at a given moment. The possible 
outcomes under consideration may change over time. Probability is the 
individual's estimate of the event occurring and utility is the value 
an individual has for each of the possible outcomes under considera-
tion. An individual may change his or her estimate of probability and/or 
utility for an outcome over time. Also, an individual may or may not 
have an estimate of the events, probabilities or:utilities held by 
the other parties to the bargaining, but if he or she does, the ac-
curacy of that estimate will vary in proportion to how much information 
the individual has about the other parties (Cohen, 1972, pp. 72-73). 
We have argued from the same perspective in Chapter Three that the 
more accurately we can understand the parties' perceptions of events, 
probabilities and utilities, the more able we are to understand the 
actions taken by the parties. It is from this perspective that we 
will review what we believe to be the estimates of events, probabilities 
and utilities held by the government and the Indian tribes at the 
outset of the negotiations. 
The United States Position 
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The event holding the highest utility for the U.S. negotiators 
was the successful negotiation of a treaty that would allow for the 
peaceful settlement of the Washington and Oregon Territories by 
sizeable numbers of Whites. They recognized that the migration of 
Whites into Oregon and Washington would continue, even if a treaty 
was not negotiated. This, they believed, would cause continued 
strife, and the ultimate result would be an outbreak of' violence. 
If violence did occur, the migration would be slowed until peace 
was restored. Although Stevens and Palmer were certain that the United 
States was militarily strong enough to put down any Indian military 
action, they recognized that that possibility would have an economic 
cost, as well as loss of life and slowing of settlement. Therefore, 
Stevens and Palmer hoped to negotiate for a sizeable portion of the 
Indian land holdings and an agreement that the Indians would reside 
on reservations. If Stevens and Palmer were successful, the Indians 
would give up title to the land, and move to reservations, and there 
would be limited White-Indian interaction, there would be peace, 
and the settlement of the territories would be expedited. 
Although there is little question that Stevens and Palmer 
saw themselves in a relatively superior position in the bargaining, 
it should be noted that they were aware of the possibility that 
they might not be able to successfully negotiate a treaty on their 
terms (Stevens, 1900, p. 60). As we shall see, they were forced 
to revise the terms of their offers in order to get the desired goal. 
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The Nez Perce Position 
The Nez Perce entered the negotiations with a high utility 
for the protection of their lands. As we have indicated earlier, the• 
Nez Perce objected when Anson Dart suggested moving the coastal tribes 
onto Nez Perce territory. The Nez Perce did not feel the pressure 
of the White immigration and settlement that was being experienced 
by the other tribes because their lands were remote and not generally 
suited to agriculture. In essence, the Nez Perce could keep the bulk 
of their lands and gain the advantages of supplies, schools and 
other improvements, as well as the protection of living on a reservation 
restricted to Whites if they entered into a treaty that maintained most 
of their lands. 
Another item of high utility for the Nez Perce was friendship 
and good relations with the Whites. The specific cause of this posi-
tion--acceptance of the Christian religion, the promise of better 
economic goods, or an internal power struggle--is debatable. This 
does not, however, negate the fact that the Nez Perce, and especially 
Lawyer, took great care to exhibit a spirit of friendship and coopera-
tion. The depth of this friendship will be explored during the course 
of the analysis. 
The Position of the Other Indians 
The Walla Wallas, the Cayuse and the Yakimas were the three 
other major tribes present at the Council. Although similar to the 
Nez Perce in their hunter-gatherer form of life, the three tribes took 
substantially different positions than the Nez Perce. 
For these tribes, like the Nez Perce, the land was essential 
to their existence, and since it was in the interest of the tribes to 
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maintain their land holdings, the tribes were generally opposed to the 
sale of the land. These tribes seemed to understand that the loss 
of the land would cause them to make massive changes in their lifestyle. 
As a result, the tribes were actively working to prevent the success 
of the Council, thereby slowing the White migration into the territory. 
The evidence indicates that the tribes were aware of the government 
policy of land acquisition and also that the tribes were actively 
working to prevent this from occurring (Josephy, 1965, p. 313). 
The tribes had been in constant contact in 1854 and 1855 
keeping each other informed of the activities of the government agents. 
The leader of the tribes was Kamiakin, chief of the Yakimas. The 
record indicates that Kamiakin was working with Young Chief and Peopeo 
Moxmox to form an alliance of the three tribes so that they could 
prevent the government from taking their lands in the same manner in 
which the lands of the coastal tribes had been taken (p. 312). There 
is speculation that Kamiakin, Peopeo Moxmox and Young Chief plotted 
to kill all the imites at the Council and start an outbreak that would 
drive all Whites from the area (Kip, 1897, p. 25, Stevens, 1900, p. 60). 
The Walla Wallas, the Cayuse, and the Yakimas placed a high utility 
on preventing any treaty that would cause the loss of their lands. 
The evidence further indicates that they were willing to engage in 
armed conflict to prevent this loss.* Obviously, then, the goodwill of 
the government was of little utility to these tribes. 
*The tribes began open conflict with the government in late October, 1855. 
This conflict resulted when Whites began moving onto Indian lands that were 
given up in the 1855 Council. According to the treaty, the lands were not 
to be given up and the Indians to move onto reservations until the treaty 
was ratified and the Indians had been paid for their lands The treaty 
was not ratified by the Senate until 1859 and the payments did not begin 
until 1860. 
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Some have argued that the only reason that an outbreak did 
not occur during the Council was that on June 2, Lawyer moved his 
tent next to that of Stevens to prevent an attack on the Whites by 
the WalJa Wallas, Cayuse and Yakimas. Others have argued that Lawyer 
was a coward who was rejected by his people and that he moved hts tent 
to prevent his own people from taking hostile action against him (Drury, 
197q, pp. 111-115). There were only 47 soldiers on the Council grounds 
so it is doubtful that the second explanation is credible. The first 
explantion is, however, probably too dramatic. The Kip diary does not 
report Lawyer's moving his lodge and it is doubtful that an event 
of that magnitude would have escaped an individual who otherwise kept 
a rather detailed record. But, the diary does indicate that Nez 
Perce opposition to open conflict prevented the other tribes from 
taking any hostile action (Kip, 1897, p. 25). 
Thus, as the Walla Wal]as, Cayuse and Yakimas prepared for 
the opening of the Council we would argue that their highest utility 
was keeping their lands, and that they preferred no treaty to a treaty 
that would take their lands. We also believe that these tribes under-
stood the government policy of land acquisition and were bitterly opposed. 
Finally, we believe that these three tribes were of the opinion 
that the Indians, if unified, were strong enough to drive the Whites 
from the area. This also indicates that the tribes were aware that if they 
were not united with the Nez Perce, and, as long as the Nez Perce refused 
to join them, the probability of successfully routing the Whites from 
the area was relatively small. 
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The Treaty Analysis 
We now turn our attention to the transcript of the bargaining 
sessions. We will review the negotiations on a day-to-day basis. 
Day 1, Tuesday, May 29, 1855 
The Council was scheduled to open at noon and finally got 
underway officially shortly after 2 p.m. with the traditional smoking 
of pipes. The major portion of the activities involved the swearing 
in of interpreters and a brief opening statement by Stevens. The 
session lasted about two hours as rain began to fall about 4 p.m. 
Communication between the parties centered on procedural 
questions. The manner in which these procedural questions were hRndled 
illustrates competitive patterns of interpersonal relationships. 
Stevens, knowing that most of the Indians distrusted him, 
attempted to establish himself as an honest man who was not about to use 
the translation process to mislead. He gave elaborate attention to the 
idea that he was only proposing the interpreters; that the Indians 
could have additional interpreters; that the interpreters would 
"truly interpret" {S]ickpoo and Walker, 1974, p. 88), and that "when 
you (the Indians) cannot understand what we say to you, stop us and we 
will repeat it" (p. 87). 
He also attempted to establish himself as the dominant force 
in the negotiations. He took charge of the procedures of the session 
and in his opening statement said, "My Children" (p. 87). Stevens 
further attempted to establish a dependent role for the Indians by 
offering the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Yakima oxen for slaughter 
and telling them that they were his guests, as he had been a guest of 
many of their chiefs in times past. 
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Young Chief of the Cayuse did not rise to the bait, but instead 
asserted the independence of the Indians when he responded, "We have 
plenty of cattle, they are close to our camp. We have already killed 
three and have plenty of provisions" (p. 88). Stevens repeated the offer 
and Young Chief responded, "We do not throw away your offer. If 
we want any we will come to you" (p. 88). Stevens then made the same 
offer to the Yakimas, and Young Chief responded that "Kamiakin is 
supplied at our camp" (p. 88). Young Chief was obviously attempting 
to establish a position of independence from Stevens by refusing 
the provisions. By speaking for the Yakimas he was, in effect, telling 
Stevens that the Cayuse and the Yakimas were united--a position of power. 
Young Chief further exerted his independence at the end of the 
session when he told Stevens, "We will talk slowly not all in one day. 
No snow falls at this season of the year. There will be time for 
you to go anywhere you wish" (p. 87). He was telling Stevens that 
he was not about to be rushed into any agreement, and that if there 
was to be an agreement, it would be consumated in due time, and that 
Stevens was not in control of that time. Following the session Peopeo 
Moxmox and Kamiakin dined with the governors, but the content of 
their discussion is unknown. Young Chief declined an invitation to 
join them at' dinner (Stevens, 1900, p. 42). 
Day 2, Wednesday, May 30, 1855 
On the second day of the Council, the government negotiators 
attempted persuasion and strategy as well as continuing to stress 
their interpersonal relationship with the Indians. The Indians listened 
for slightly less than three hours, but did not 'make a response. 
When the session is analyzed 'from the perspective of search, strategy 
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and persuasion, we see there is no search for additional events. 
However, there is a good deal of persuasion.attempted and the first 
strategic moves are made by the government. 
Throughout the course of Stevens' presentation of what the 
government wanted the Indians to accept, he attempted to persuade them 
that this was for their benefit. In this way he attempted to alter 
the values which the Indians held for selling their lands 'and moving 
onto the reservations. 
The first strategic move made by Stevens was his assertion 
that Indians were destroyed and chased from their lands when Indians 
and Whites lived together, and how this had not happened when the Chero-
kees moved onto the reservations. Stevens was saying that the govern-
ment could protect the Indians if they would be willing to live on 
reservations. If they were not, there was certain to be trouble 
and that the Indians would suffer. By bringing the argument into 
the discussion, Stevens was attempting to manipulate an event under 
his control (protection of the Indians from "bad white men"), in order 
that the Indians would be inclined to accept the proposal. The only 
thing missing in Stevens' statements was a direct threat that he would 
allow the Indians to be destroyed if they did not accept the reservation 
system. 
Another strategic action was Stevens' statement that the 
government wanted the Indians to live on reservations and to selJ the 
remainder of their lands. Stevens was also involved in strategic actions 
when he told the Indians that the government wanted them to have 
mills, shops, and education •. Although Stevens talked about these items 
in terms of "we want these things for you" (p. 90), he did not make 
74 
specific offers. However, the statements were made to make the Indians 
believe that these things would accrue to them if an agreement was 
reached. In essence, Stevens was making the general commitment that 
the Indians would receive protection, education, shops, mills and payment 
for their lands if they entered into a treaty. 
Cohen argues that strategic actions are the most position defining 
of the negotiating behaviors. This case supports the position as the 
strategic actions taken by Stevens clearly defined the position of the 
government. 
Cohen has also argued that persuasive actions are normally taken 
before strategic attempts because persuasive actions are less value 
revealing. Stevens' attempts to persuade the Indians of the benefits of 
education, shops, mills and the reservation system came before he entered 
these events into the discussion. The action fol]ows the pattern suggested 
by Cohen. Stevens anticipated the hosti]ity and attempted to reduce it 
before making his strategic ~ove. 
Palmer and Stevens were concerned with the interpersonal rela-
tionship between the negotiators and the Indians and between the Presi-
dent and the Indians. The communication, with little exception, is on 
a competitive basis. 
Competitive communication behavior is evident in Stevens' 
argument about the Indians needing protection from the Whites. During 
the long and many times distorted history of White-Indian relations from 
the time of the settlement of New England, Stevens blamed the conflicts 
on "had white men," (S]ickpoo and Walker, 1974, p. 90) without indicating 
who they were, except to say they were not government people, using Lewis 
and Clark as examples of White government people who had not caused 
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trouble. Because the trouble was caused by "bad white men" (p. 90), 
Stevens told the Indians, it was important that a treaty be made to protect 
them from these men. Stevens told the Indians that they would face the 
same problems the Eastern tribes had faced if they did not reach an 
agreement, and, therefore, the Indians were highly dependent upon the 
outcome of this Council. 
Palmer worked briefly in the cooperative mode in his opening 
statement, as he indicated that Stevens and he believed that the Indians 
were capable of good judgment and mature thought. He said, "You are men 
able to judge between good and bad; and when my brother speaks to you, 
you can judge whether it be good or bad" (Slickpoo and Walker, 1974, p. 89). 
Stevens followed this same cooperative mode when he opened his speech hy 
sayirig, "You are men. You have families: You have the means to live" 
(p. 89). 
A]though Stevens opened with the cooperative statement, he did not 
remain consistent, and returned to the competitive mode when he attempted 
to express the President's concern for the Indians. He said: 
Why did he send my brother and myself here this day, to 
say this to you? Because you are his children; his red 
children are as dear to him as his white children; his 
red chi]dren are men, they have hearts, they have sense; 
they feel kindness they resent injury; We want no injuries 
to resent (p. 90). 
Although Stevens was telling the Indians they were men of ability and 
maturity, with whom the Whites did not wish to have conflict, he leaves 
little doubt that they were to be subservient to the President. In 
other words, the President was the father, and in this capacity the 
Indians would have to bend to the wishes of the government. This position 
may not have been obvious to the Indians at this point, but it would 
seem certain that Stevens was of this mind. 
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Competition is also evident in the manner in which the trans-
mission of the offers was handled. Stevens did not make a tentative 
proposal of how the situation mirht be resolved, but simply told the 
Indians how the government wanted it to be. He said: 
This brings us now to the question. What shall we 
do at this council? We want you and ourselves to agree -
upon tracts of land where you wi]l live; in those tracts 
of land we want each man who will work to have his own 
land, his own horses, his own cattle, and his own home 
for himself and his children (p. 92). 
Stevens quickly folJowed this with his desire to have an agent on each 
of the tracts to "protect you from bad white men" (p. 92), and to have 
schools and professional tradesmen to help the Indians learn the trades 
necessary to be self-sufficient. He then told the Indians the other 
part of the deal when he said: 
Now we want you to agree to such a state of things; 
You to have your tract with all these things; the rest 
to be the Great Father's for his white children (p. 92). 
There is no indication that the government was willing to entertain any 
other possible solutions. 
Stevens was working in the competitive mode in the process of 
preference identification and reassessment. Stevens spoke only of the 
preferences of the government, and did not mention any of the Indian 
preferences. He magnified the advantage that was to accrue to the 
Indians. He magnified the advantage that was to accrue to the 
Indians. He indicated to the Indians that they would not only receive 
the protection from the "had white men," but also Stevens said: 
Besides all these things, these shops, these mi]ls 
and these schools which I have mentioned; we must pay you 
for the land which you give to the Great Father; these 
schools and mills and shops, are only a portion of the 
payment. We want besides to agree with you for a fair sum 
to be given for your lands, to be paid through a terms of 
years as are your schools and your shops (pp. 92-93). 
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Only demands for immediate acceptance of the reservation system 
were missing from a totally competitive stance. After making his pre-
sentation, Stevens, perhaps sensing opposition from the Indians, said: 
Now these payments are something you will have to 
think much about. Whatever is done is done with your 
free consent; I have more to say about these payments, 
about the agent, and about your doing better, as I think 
you will if we can agree (p. 93). 
Palmer folJowed Stevens' lead in not pressing for an immediate response, 
indicating: 
••• it is not expected we can come together with one 
day's talk; nor do we expect you can understand with 
what has been said all that we want. You will not make 
up your mind until you hear all we have to say (p. 93). 
And, then he added, ", •. sometimes when people have a matter to settle 
they commence way off; but as they understand each other they come together" 
(p. 93). 
Day 3, Thursday, May 31, 1855 
The third day of the Council found the government negotiators 
spending most of their speeches reiterating and expanding the government 
position outlined the day before. The thrust of Stevens and Palmer's 
speeches was to persuade the Indians that the programs suggested were 
in their best interests. Stevens opened the Council session at 11:30 a.m., 
spoke for about two hours and then turned the proceedings over to Palmer. 
Palmer finished about 3:30 p.m. The Indians did not respond. 
When we look at the speeches we see that the major portions were 
directed toward persuasion, and that only a minor portion was spent in 
strategy and no time spent in search. The failure of the Indians to 
respond is likely the cause that no search was undertaken. The strategic 
actions were Stevens' assertion that the government would ca~ry out its 
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part of the bargain, if an agreement was reached, and would provide the 
supplies and services called for in the proposed treaty, and Palmer 
speakin~ about the threat of Indians and Whites living together. 
The persuasion of Stevens and Palmer was directed toward change 
in the Indians' value for the government's proposal. It would seem 
that Stevens and Palmer were aware that the Indians were opposed to the 
reservation system, and as a result they attempted to alter that value. 
The communication behaviors of Palmer and Stevens are competi-
tive preference identification and reassessment. Throughout the courses 
of their speeches we see them speak only of alternatives preferable to 
their position, magnify the preference among alternatives to favor them-
selves, indicate a high degree of position rigidity and attempt to bias 
the Indians' perceptions of the government proposal. In addition they 
worked to persuade the Indians that the government proposal was the only 
event that had value. 
Stevens opened the session with a reiteration of the government 
proposals. In talking about the porposals, Stevens said that it was 
the government desire to have the women learn to weave, spin, make clothes 
and other things, "like white people" (p. 94) and he added that the 
government would also provide additional clothing, a point he had not 
mentioned in the initial speech. 
After once more arguing for the values of the animal husbandry-
farming form of lifestyle, Stevens began a new persuasive argument. 
He attempted to alleviate the Indian fears of change by indicating 1 that 
change was not always for the worse, and that, in fact, the Indians had-
benefitted from the changes brought by earlier contact with the Whites. 
He said: 
The horse carries you wither you wish to go, yourself, 
your wife, your children; and your packs, and he works in 
your fjeld; your cattle furnish you with a portion of your 
food; your cows furnish you with milk and you already know 
how to make butter; we trust that you will make butter and 
cheese, and that your women will all have churns. Formerly 
you raised no wheat, no potatoes, now you have both grain 
and vegetables. Is not this a great change? A change 
which you al] have seen. Has it not been for your good 
(p. 94)? 
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Stevens said the acceptance of reservations would not prevent the 
Indians from going to the plains to hunt buffalo, or to travel elsewhere 
to gather roots and berries. To the contrary, Stevens suggested that 
if the Indians and the government could reach an agreement, another 
Council would be held at which the Blackfeet, enemies of most of the 
tribes at the Council, would be present. At this second Council, the 
government would work out an agreement so that the Blackfeet would no 
longer attack hunting parties or steal horses. In support of this 
argument, Stevens said that James Doty, secretary of the Council, had 
spent a year with the Blackfeet and found that most of them were good 
people who desired to have peace with the western tribes. Stevens asserted 
that the B]ackfeet wanted to make the change, and that the government 
had agreed to help them, provided that they did not molest the other tribes. 
While Stevens was stressing the positive alternatives which 
might occur if an agreement might be reached, Palmer took a drastically 
- different attack, stressing the problems which had resulted when Whites 
and Indians had failed to reach agreements about reservations. In effect, 
Stevens was holding out the carrot, while Palmer was wielding the threat. 
Palmer followed Stevens' historical perspective of White-Indian 
relations to develop three lines of argumentation. During this recounting, 
Palmer stressed that, (1) there had always been conflict, and eventually 
war, when the Whites and Indians had lived indiscriminately together, 
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(2) that the Whites came in small numbers at the start but soon became 
as "numerous as the leaves on the trees" (p. 100), and (3) that when 
the Indians did not listen to the counsel of the government treaty 
makers the Indians ultimately.suffered. Each of the arguments was 
designed to gain Indian acceptance of the reservation program suggested 
by Stevens, by reducing the attractiveness (value) of alternatives 
under consideration. 
Although Palmer presented a simplified perspective, he may have 
been aware that the Indians did not accept all that he had said. He 
spoke of the Indians who had not prospered on reservations, "All who have 
settled upon these tracts have not done well, for they are lazy and have 
foolishly thrown away what has been done for them" (p. 101). It is 
doubtful the Indians missed the message, those who go to the reservation 
prosper if they are smart and ambitious, those who do not bargain end 
up dead. 
Palmer attempted to build the credibility of the government when 
he returned to the concept of the "bad white men" in hi.s final remarks. 
He argued that the Whites counseling the Indians not to accept the treaty 
and reservations were doing so in order to cheat the Indians. He argued 
that the Whi.tes would marry an Indian woman to gain control over a 
herd of horses and when this was achieved they would leave the woman 
and her children. He added that rustlers had stolen horses, and that it 
was only through the actions of rhe government that they had been 
returned. 
Day 4, Friday, _J~ne 1, 1855 
The Indians may have understood that they were being offered 
only one alternative, and this may be the reason that they asked that 
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the Council not meet on Friday, June 1. The exact reason for the delay 
is not known, but is has been speculated that the Indians wanted to 
discuss alternative plans of action. The official record indicates 
that Young Chief sent a message to the negotiators on Thursday evening 
asking for the day off so that his people could "make a great Feast and 
have a general holiday" (p. 101). The request was accepted by the 
negotiators. 
Although the Indians may have asked for the break to consider 
other alternatives, the major chiefs dined with Stevens and Palmer on 
Thursday night and Friday. 
Day 5, Saturday, June 2, 1855 
The C0uncil reconvened about noon. After an opening statement 
by Palmer, the negotiators asked for a response, and for the first time 
the Indians did. Palmer's statement was a general reiteration of thP 
government offer and the corresponding arguments in favor of the offer, 
while the Indian response was a general questioning of the intent and 
honesty of the negotiators. 
Dnring the session the government negotiators did not search 
for new alternatives, but rather attempted to use strategy to gain 
their goals. On the other hand, a limited Indian response indicated 
that they may have been in the process of searching for an alternative 
more acceptable than the reservation system. The strategic move of 
the government negotiators was to talk about their inability to stop 
the Whites from immigrating to the area, but offering the Indians 
the promise that they could protect the reservations, if the Indians 
chose to accept them under the proposed treaty. 
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The Indian response was value-defining in that it indicated 
to the government negotiators that they placed a high value on the land 
and were not immediately ready to make the trade for goods and services. 
The negative tone of their response strongly indicates that the Indians 
did not like the government offer and that they wanted some other un-
specified alternative. 
Palmer began where he had left off on Thursday, when he argued 
that it had been only 50 years since the first Whites, Lewis and Clark, 
had appeared and already there were sizeable numbers of Whites in the 
areas to the west and that the Whites would continue to come. He said: 
You may ask why do they come? Can you stop the waters of the 
Columbia river from flowing on its course. Can you prevent 
the wind from blowing? Can you prevent the rain from falling? 
You are answered No! Like the grasshoppers on the plains; 
some years there will be more come than others, you cannot 
stop them. Our cheif cannot stop them, we cannot stop them 
(p. 102) 
Palmer was pressing for agreement, arguing from a position that weakness 
is strength, He was saying that he and the government were powerless 
to stop the immigration of the Whites, and, thus, the only option 
open to the Indians was to accept the reservations proposed by the 
government. One might ask the question, "if the government cannot 
stop the Whites from corning when the Indians are off the reservations, 
how can they keep the Whites from corning when the Indians are on the 
reservation?" It would seem that this is a basic discrepency of the 
government position and illustrates rather clearly that the government 
position was rather rigid--the Indians must move to the reservations. 
The fact that this action illustrates the government's position clearly 
is in agreement with Cohen's position that strategic actions are 
more position-defining than ~ersuasion. 
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Palmer also pressed for ae>reement when he discounted the 
Indian alternative of no treaty. Palmer said "And now while there is 
room to select for you a home where there are no white men living let 
us do so" (p. 102). Palmer assured the Indians that the government 
had protected other tribes that had entered into reservation-creating 
treaties and that the government would keep its end of the bargain. 
Stevens asked the Indians to respond. The initial response 
came from Five Crows, a Cayuse, who responded, "we are tired," and 
then continued briefly, asking, "do you speak true when you call me 
brother?" (p. 103), and then indicated that he believed in only one 
God, the same God as Palmer and Stevens. 
Peopeo Moxmox, the Walla Walla chief, followed and was be-
ligerant in tone and direct in his questioning of the negotiators. 
He said that it seemed that everything was prearranged and that 
there was no time for thought about the treaty. He asked the nego-
tiators if they were really honest when he said, "We have not seen in 
a true light the object of your speeches; as if there was a post 
set between.us ••• " (p. 104). "You have spoken ill a round about 
way; speak straight" (p. 104), he said. Moxmox also objected to 
the trading of the land for goods, saying, "Goods and the Earth 
are not equal; goods are for using on Earth. I do not know where they 
have given lands for goods" (p. 104). Obviously, he was indicating 
that his value for the land was far above that of the goods and ser-
vices that had been promised. Peopeo Moxmox added that he needed 
time to "think, quietly, slowly" (p. 104), and then also questioned 
the integrity of the government negotiators when he said: 
You have spoken in a manner partly tending to Evil. Speak 
plain to us. I am a poor Indian, show me charity; if there 
was a cheif among the Nez Perces or Cayuses, if they saw 
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evil done they would put a stop to it and all would be quiet; 
Such Cheifs I hope Gov. Stevens and Gen'l Palmer are. I should 
feel very much ashamed if the Americans should do anything 
wrong. (pp. 104-105) 
What occurred later this Saturday night, as indicated previously, 
is uncertain. Whether Lawyer came to the Stevens camp and offerred to 
protect the Whites from an Indian conspiracy or whether he came for his 
own protection, will never be known with certainty. It is likely, however, 
that Lawyer did meet with Stevens and probably indicated that the Indians 
were not generally well disposed to the progress of the negotiations. He 
probably told Stevens that the Nez Perce were still friendly to the Whites, 
but they were being pressured by other groups to reject the proposals 
under consideration. It may also have been that Lawyer was seeking 
support for his position as the leader of the Nez Perce. Support for this 
speculation comes from the opening of the Monday session, where Stevens 
called upon Lawyer to speak and Lawyer responded with a non-committal 
response, asking for fair treatment of "a poor people." The truth may 
never be known. 
Day 6, Sunday, June 3, 1855 
No Council was held. 
Day 7, Monday, June 4, 1855 
During this session the Indians responded at length for the first 
time and for the first time the government negotiators indicated the 
location and size of the reservations they wanted. Nearly all of the 
behavior is competitive. The government negotiators were forced into 
detailing the reservations by Indian questions about the motives of the 
negotiators. The exception was Lawyer, the lead speaker for the Indians 
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who was cooperative. However, he seemed uncertain of what position he 
wished to take and gave a rather incoherent presentation. 
The detailing of the reservations is obviously value-defining. 
It told the Indians specifically what the government had in mind, and 
what the government wanted of them. Persuasive attempts of Stevens to 
sell the particular system to the Indians is also value-defining, in that 
it gave the Indians the belief that this is what the government was 
truly supporting. By outlining all of the particular advantages, better 
use of money, more protection, etc., Stevens was attempting to convince 
the Indians that this program was in their best interests, now and in 
the years ahead. 
Lawyer did not accept the government position, nor did he speak 
in opposition, but rather asked that the negotiators have pity on the 
Indians as they were a poor people with a poor land. He said, "You see 
the marks of our country, one stream runs one way another runs another 
way, it is all rock'' (p. 106). Without approving or disapproving of 
the events of the Council, Lawyer ended his remarks by indicating that 
others wished to speak. It would seem that Lawyer did not want to be 
the first to say that µe favored the reservations, but, on the other hand, 
he did not want to place himself in opposition to the concepts outlined 
by the government negotiators. 
The Commissioners sought to get the response of others and those 
who responded questioned the integrity of the proceedings. Kamiakin 
said, " ••. perhaps you have spoken straight" (p. 106), and Stickus said, 
"I would wish that the President was here so that we might all listen to 
him" (p. 107)~ Peopeo Moxmox, who was invited to speak early in the 
session but refused, later in the afternoon responded at some length! 
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questioning the negotiators' failure to indicate the specific lands they 
were seeking. He said, "I do not know for what lands they (the inter-
preters) have spoken. If they had mentioned the lands that (they) had 
spoken of then I should have understood them" (p. 107). 
Eagle-From-The-Light, a Nez Perce chief, spoke about the problems 
that he had with White people and also questioned the motives of the 
government negotiators. Eagle-From-The-Light indicated that he had seen 
his brother hanged by Whites for no apparent reason and that his father 
had gone East at the request of Henry Harmon Spalding and that his father 
was killed and the body never returned. He also objected to the work 
of Spalding, indicating that Spalding seemed to be "two in one" (p. 109), 
a preacher and trader. Although the tone of his speech was antagonistic 
and questioning, Eagle-From-The-Light ended on a positive note, saying, 
II .. it is the tale I had to tell you, and now I am going to hunt friend-
ship and good advice. We will come straight here--slowly perhaps,--
but we will come straight" (p. 109). 
Evidently sensing the antagonism and questioning, Stevens was 
forced into a strategic move--outlining the reservations and the tribes 
he wanted on them. The minutes of the Council indicate the reservations 
outlined by Stevens. 
For the principal tribP.s present. we have thought of 
two Reservations. One Reservation in the Nes Perses coun-
try and one in the Yakama country. The Reservation in the 
Nes Perses country, to extend from the Blue mountains to 
the spurs of the Bitter Root, and from the Palouse river 
to part way up the Grande Ronde and Salmon River. 
On this Reservation we wish to place the Spokanes, 
the Cayuses, the Walla WalJas, as well as the Nes Perses, 
and also the Umati]las. That will be something for them 
to think about to see whether they can agree to it. 
The Yakama Reservation to extend from the Attannun 
river--to include the valley of the Pisco river--and from 
the Yakama river to the Cascade Mountains. On this Reser-
vation we wish to place the ColvilJes, 0-Kin-a-kunes, 
Palouse, Pesquouse, Klitatats, and the bands on the north 
side of the river below the Walla Wallas as far as the 
Kuthlapoodle river, near the Cowlitz. All these as well 
as the Yakamas on that Reservation. 
There is a third Reservation East of Mt. Jefferson 
which will be explained to you by Gen'l Palmer; there 
it is proposed to place the bands below the Umatillas. 
(pp. 109-110) 
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After seven days in Council the government had finally given the 
Indians the specifics of what they expected. 
After outlining the reservation boundaries, Stevens indicated to 
the Indians that he wanted them to consider the proposal and respond, as 
he said: 
We want you to think about this and see if you like 
it. You may think the Reservations are not good. If 
not you will say so. The Cayuses, the Walla Wallas, the 
Umatillas, may prefer the Yakamas to the Nes Perces Re-
servation, and they may not like either. (p. 109) 
Although it would seem that Stevens was telling the Indians that 
they had some options as to which reservation they might be placed upon, 
a cooperative behavior, the_ statement would also seem to indicate Stevens 
was demanding that the Indians would be placed on some reservation, a 
competitive behavior. 
Stevens then began to sell the Inaians on the benefits of the 
particular plan. He argued that the location of the reservations was 
just off the wagon route to the sea, and that this would allow the 
government to keep the Whites away from the Indians, but at the same time 
the Indians would be able to drive their horses to market. He asserted 
that the reservations were large enough so that each family could have 
a farm, and that there was winter grazing lands for all. In addition, 
there were good salmon rivers, and there was some game and adequate 
roots and berries. 
Sensitive to the problem of having several tribes on the same 
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reservation, Stevens argued that this would allow the government to make 
better use of resources, including being served by a single agent. He 
indicated that more could be done with the same means, but then stopped 
and indicated that he would have more to say about that at the next 
session. Stevens then again returned to the argument that the Indians 
needed to be protected from unsavory White people, as he finished his 
speech. He keyed into Eagle-From-The-Light's objection to Spalding when 
he said; 
We can better protect you from bad white men there. 
We can better prevent the trader and the preacher all 
in one man going there. We can better prevent bad men 
telling you to dance, and cheating you with lies. We 
can better stop the theif who comes to steal your horses. 
Your horse$ will be saved to you and there will be no 
theives to throw into hell-fire. (p. 110) 
The Indians did not respond, and the Council adjourned for the day. 
Day 8, Tuesday, June 5, 1855 
During the eighth day the government negotiators spelled out the 
detailed boundaries of the proposed reservation, the amounts of money 
to be expended, the conditions under which it was to be expended and 
then spent an extended amount of time attempting to persuade the Indians 
that the reservations and conditions were in their best interests. Only 
a single Indian leader responded. That was Stickus, a Cayuse, who had 
been general]y friendly to the Whites, but who was now expressing 
opposition to the offer. 
As we analyze the behaviors, we see that the participants 
were operating in the competitive framework. The government negotiators 
identified only alternatives that were favorable to their position, 
stressed the importance of reaching agreement on their terms, made only 
one offer and pressed for its acceptance, and indicated control over the 
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negotiation process. Stickus' response indicates an implicit rejection 
of the government offer and little ground for commonality or compromise. 
By talking about what the government was willing to give, the 
negotiators were attempting to force the tribes into agreement through 
strategic action. This is best illustrated by the offer of specific 
amounts of money and housing for the chiefs and sub-chiefs. By indi-
cating the specific sums, the government negotiators were telling the 
chiefs and sub-chiefs what they would receive if this treaty was nego-
tiated and thus were attempting to alter the chiefs' values for the 
proposed treaty. By putting forth the specific details of the offers, 
the reservation locations, and indicating which tribes were to be on each 
of the reservations, the government negotiators clearly outlined their 
preferences. This is in agreement with Cohen's position that strategic 
actions are the most position defining. 
Stevens opened the Council session detailing the government 
position. He reiterated the location of the reservations, but this time 
used a map to provide the specific details of the reservation under 
consideration by the government.* He told the Indians that there would 
be a place on the reservations for each tribe and that each tribe would 
have a blacksmith, a school and a farmer. The Nez Perce, because they 
had larger numbers would be given two of each. He indicated that the 
agent for the reservation would live in a central place and that there 
would be a central agricultural and industrial school for all of the 
tribes. In addition there was to be a tinner and tin shop and a wagon 
(*NOTE: The exact boundaries have been under dispute since the treaty. 
Several court cases have heard, and the courts have made awards to the 
Nez Perce. For a full discussion of the issue, see Josephy, 1965f 
pp. 334-336.) 
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maker and wheelright for each reservation. There was also to be two 
sawmills and two f]our mi]ls each. 
Stevens attempted to alter the chiefs' views of the treaty when 
he told them that the government was prepared to spend $100,000 to move 
the Indians onto the reservation and to build homes for the chiefs and 
sub-chiefs, break the land, and to reimburse Indians for the improvements 
that they had made on lands that would be given up. In addition the 
government proposed to pay $250,000 over 20 years. 
Stevens added another strategic event when he said the government 
was willing to pay each of the head chiefs a salary of $500 per year for 
a period of 20 years. Also, the government would build a house for each 
of the head chiefs. Stevens told the chiefs that each year's money 
was to be spent through the agent so that the money could be most effectively 
used. Stevens said; 
We can furnish you with nearly twice as many goods 
with the same amount of money as you can get from the 
Traders. We shall buy the things you want in New York and 
San Francisco at cheap rates and good articles. The expense 
of getting them to you will not come out of your money; 
it will cost you nothing. You now pay Eight or Nine dollars 
for a blanket at Fort Walla WalJa, we shalJ furnish you 
two such blankets for less than that sum, say from six 
to seven dollars. At fort Walla Walla a flannel shirt 
cost three dollars. You pay for the calico shirt at Walla 
Walla one and a half and two dollars. We can furnish 
calico shirts for fifty cents a piece. If we furnish the 
goods therefore, you will get three blankets, three £Jan-
nel shirts and three calico shirts for the same money you 
now pay for one blanket, one flannel shirt, one calico 
shirt and have to make a long journey for them besides~ 
(p. 113) 
Stevens attempted to gain the additional favor with the chiefs by 
indicating that the decision of how the money was to be spent would rest 
with them. 
Stevens said the reservations were large and included the best 
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fisheries on the Snake and Grande Ronde rivers and the prize camush grounds 
of the Nez Perce. He told the Indians that they would have the right to 
hunt and collect berries outside the reservation on lands that were not 
taken by Whttes and that the Indians would hRve the use of the high~ays 
to take cattle and other items to trade with the Whites. AJso, they 
would have common fishing rights with the Whites. Stevens attempted to 
alter the Indians' view of the treaty by re-entering the implicit threat 
that they were destroyed when Whites and Indians lived together when he said: 
You will see that you will be better taken care of 
all on one reservation; each tribe having its own place, 
than if the Spokanes were on one Reservation with the 
whites all around them, the Nes Perces and Umatillas on 
one Reservation with the whites all around them. (p. 112) 
Stevens indicated that he was treating these Indians better than those 
on the coast. He said, 
They (the coastal tribes) number more than all the 
tribes here present. They have all agreed, should the 
President decide to go on one Reservation. That Reser-
vation is only about one-fiftieth part as large as this. 
(p. 112) 
Stevens ended his speech saying, "I have tried to talk plain and to speak 
straight out" (p. 1]3), and then returned the proceedings to Palmer. 
Palmer pushed for acceptance as he told the Indians that Stevens 
had said as much as he could and that "it is for you to say whether you 
will receive it or throw it away" (p. 114). He referred to an earlier 
remark by Young Chief that the negotiators on both sides needed to 
consider not only themselves, but future generations. Palmer told the 
Indians that" •. it is the duty of a parent to provide for his 
children" (p. 1J4), in urging them to accept the proposal. He continued, 
invoking the spirit of God when he said, " ..• I say it is good; That 
I would not deceive you; The Great Spirit who knows the heart of al] men 
knows that I desire to promote your good" (p. 114). 
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Palmer outlined the procedures that would be followed if the 
Indians agreed to a treaty. He said that the treaty would have to go 
to Washington and be approved before the money could be spent, and that 
this procedure would take at least two years. Palmer was being honest 
with the Indians, he was telling them the procedure as it was going to 
happen, but the explanation also indicates Palmer assumed he was in a 
dominant position in procedural matters, a competitive behavior. The 
Indians, in effect, were told to negotiate the treaty and if the leaders 
in Washington accepted it. it was binding on all. If the leaders in 
Washington decided they did not like the treaty, it was null and void. 
Palmer told the Indians they were to have the right of free travel 
outside of the reservation, and explained the nature of the railroad and 
the telegraph and also indicated that the government expected the right 
of construction on Indian lands. During this explanation, Palmer gave 
a detailed account of how the telegraph and railroad functioned and 
inadvertant]y indicated his questioning of the ability of the Indians 
when he said, "You may not understand them now, but when you know as much 
as the white man you will" (p. 115). It would seem that Palmer felt 
he was dealing with someone of less intellect than his own, and it is 
doubtful that the Indians would have missed the insult--intended or 
unintended. 
Palmer continued to push for acceptance of the treaty. He said, 
Now I want you all to talk among yourselves and 
think about what has been said to you, and I want you 
to think of it like men. When you think of it if you 
say that what we have said is good and that you receive 
it, you can express it to us and we can soon write out 
the Treaty. (p. 116) 
Perhaps feeling some questioning on the part of the Indians, Palmer did 
not press further, but instead suggested that the Indians taKe time to 
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consider the offer and if they did not understand they should "come and 
inquire and we will explain" (p. 116). Palmer finished his speech saying, 
If any of you wish to speak we will listen to you. 
Or if you can make up your minds so as to give us an 
answer this evening come and do so and we will be ready 
to receive it. (p. 116) 
Stickus, the normally friendly Cayuse leader, was quick to reply. 
My friends I wish to show you my mind, interpret right 
for me. How is it I have been troubled in mind? If your 
mothers were here in this country who gave you birth and 
suckled you, and while you were sucking some person came 
and took away your mother and left you alone and sold your 
mother, how would you feel then? This our mother this 
country as if we drew our living from her. 
My friends al] of this you have taken. Had I two 
rivers I would be content to leave the one and live on 
the other. 
I name three places for myself, The Grande Ronde, the 
Touchet towards the mountains and the Tucannon. (p. 116) 
Stickus had clearly indicated the Indian position that the land was the 
essential of their lives. It was the same relationship of a child to 
its mother. Without the land the Indians could not feed themselves, and 
their very form of life and livelihood was threatened. 
With Stickus' response we see the first evidence of search of 
alternatives. Stickus was obviously opposed to the treaty as proposed. 
His statement that he wished to have the three locations of the Grande 
Ronde, Touchet and Tucannon indicates that he was searching for alterna-
tives. Although the response indicates search, it also is position 
defining in that it indicates the specific territory he wanted. His 
argument about the Indians' relationship to the land was an attempt to 
show the government negotiators that the land was highly valued. In 
indicating this high value for the land, Stickns was implicitly telling 
the negotiators that the Indians would not give up the land for little 
value, if they would give it up at all. 
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Governor Stevens took note of Stickus' response and quickly 
ended the day's session, but not before urging the Indians to meet 
early in the morning so that they could "see if we cannot agree before 
night" (p. 117)~ 
Day 9, Thursday, June 6, 1855 
The Indians chose to not meet on Wednesday, but rather met 
among themselves to consider the government offer. 
There is some evidence to indicate that the Indians were 
~becoming more hostilP to the government proposals. Kip (1897) 
wrote of his experience on Tuesday evening: 
There is evidently a more hostile feeling towards 
the whites getting up among some of the tribes, of 
which we had tonight a very unmistakable proof. The Cayuse, 
we have know, have never been friendly, but hitherto they 
have disguised their feeling. Tonight, as Lieut. Gracie and I 
attempted, as usual to enter their camp, they showed a decided 
opposition; we were motioned back, and the young warriors threw 
themselves in our way to obstrl1ct our advance. To yield to this, 
however, or show any signs of being intimidated, would_have 
been ruinous with the Indians, so were obliged to carry out 
our original intentions. We placed our horses abreast, riding 
round the Indians, where it was possible, and at other times 
forcing our way through, believing that they would not dare to 
resort to actual violence. If, however, this hostile feeling 
at the Council increases, how long will it be before we have 
an actual outbreak. (p. 18) 
Kip went to the Cayuse camp on Wednesday night and following 
he wrote: 
There was no attempt to exclude us, though if savage and 
scowling looks could have killed, we should both have ended 
our mortal careers this evening in this valley of Walla Walla. 
<r. 18) 
It would seem that the Indians were generally displeased 
with the proposals, with the exception of the Nez Perce who were 
losing little of their lands and who were perhaps gaining the 
upper hand on other tribes by having them located on their lands. 
However, it would seem that the Indians were not ready to start a 
war until the negotiations were complete. 
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Josephy (1965) argues that Lawyer met with Stevens at night 
and negotiated additional benefjts befjtting a head chief and that 
later he worked with other chiefs of the Nez Perce to gain support 
for the government proposal (pp. 325-326). Josephy does not document 
his argument, but on Thursday, June 7, Lawyer did support the govern-
ment position. 
Day 10, Thursday, June 7, 1855 
Following a day of negotiating among themselves, the Indians 
responded for the first time and with the exception of the Nez 
Perce the response was negative. The Indians did not want the reser-
vations as proposed for them by Palmer and Stevens. For their part, 
Palmer and Stevens attempted to answer objections. 
It becomes obvious as we look at the day's activities that 
the government and Indians were in the competitive framework. The 
government consistently pushed for acceptance of the proposal, and 
did little to indicate flexibility. In addition, they again at-
tempted to show the Indians they they were highly dependent on 
the treaty, i.e., if the treaty was not signed the Whites would come 
and the Indians could not protect themselves. For the Indians' 
part, they consistently, with the exception of the Nez Perce, re-
jected the need for an agreement, and refused to suggest alternatives 
that might lead to a common ground and agreement. 
Stevens opened the session about noon and asked for the Indian 
response. Lawyer was the first to speak and gave a meandering speech 
in which he gave Nez Perce approval for the terms of the agreement. 
Lawyer also attempted to placate the other Indians. It is 
obvious that Lawyer knew that the other Indians did not approve of 
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his position and he carefully outlined a defense for accepting the 
government offer. He traced the coming of the Whites to the new world 
and in doing so told of a story about Columbus ahd the attempt of 
Columbus to show leaders how to balance an egg on end. Lawyer said 
that the leaders could not do, but once Columbus had shown them, the 
leaders were able to do so. What Lawyer was attempting to show 
with the analogy was that once Columbus had found the new world, others 
quickly followed. The analaogy, implicitly, indicated that once 
the Whites had found their way into the Oregon territory, other were 
sure to follow. Lawyer also indicated he understood that when the 
Indians and Whites lived together it was not long before there was 
bloodshed, and that the Indians were the ones who normally suffered. 
He ilJustrated his position with reference to the flight of Delaware 
Jim, when he said: 
These children that he (Columbus) had placed in this 
country among the red people, from them the blood ran on 
both sides; that is when the laws come into this country 
to these poor people: There were a great many white people 
came back to that place; that is the reason the red people 
travelled off further and from that they kept still travel-
ling on further as the white people came up to them and 
this man's (Delawa;e Jim) people are from the same people. 
(Slickpoo and Walker, 1974. p. 117) 
Although the passage indicates one of the reasons that Lawyer was 
willing to accept the government offer, it also indicates that 
he understood what had been occurring on the Eastern side of the 
mountains. If he knew this, he probably also understood, at least 
in a general way, how the government had kept its treaty promises 
with other tribes. 
Lawyer stressed his reverence for the laws that had been 
brought to the country by Dr. White. He iuvoked the memory of E]lis 
whP.n he said: 
Elljs our Cheif spoke straight for the white people, the 
President has sent you here to us poor people. Yes! The Pre-
ident has studied this and sent you here for our good. (p. 118) 
Lawyer also stressed the history of friendship between the Whites 
and the Nez Perce since the time of the arrival of Lewis and Clark. 
Although Lawyer was generalJy cordial to the government 
negotiators duriug the course of the speech, near the end there was 
a note of questioning about the intent of the negotiators. He said: 
The governor has said the President has sent him to take 
care of his children: it was you that had spoken thus my 
brothers (Gov. Stevens and Gen. Palmer) I want the President 
to see wha~ I a poor man has said. I have your talk here 
(pointing to his note book) and although a poor man I can look 
at it from time to time. (p. 118) 
There was some doubt, but then Lawyer told the negotiators where he 
thought would be a good location for a mechanic station or ranch. 
He had obviously accepted the proposition~ 
Stevens seized the opportunity to exploit the djvision among 
the Indians and pressed for agreement, saying, "We have the heart of 
Nez Perce through their Cheif, their hearts and our hearts are one" 
(p. 119). While Lawyer and the Commissioners were together, the 
remainder of the Indian leadership was not. 
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Essentially the Indians, with the exception of the Nez Perce, 
were playing a "no-play" game, that is they wanted the Council to end 
with no action being taken; -The Indians' strategy was one of bar-
gaining from the position that weakness is strength. They outlined 
with clarity their belief that the land was a gift from God, of 
which they were the trustees, and essentially they did not have the 
power to sell or trade. If they were to sel] or trade the land they 
would feel the wrath of God. Therefore, they were a poor people 
who were not in a position to accede to the demands of the government 
negotiators. 
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Young Chief, head chief of the Cayuse, followed Lawyer and told 
the Commissioners that he was "blind" (p. 119), and did not see the 
offer very well, even though Lawyer had seen clearly. He said the 
reason he did not see the offer well was that he had not yet seen 
the offer. He said, "If I had the money in my hand then I would 
see ••. '' (p. 119). The distrust was obvious. He continued, ~alking 
about the Indian relationship to the earth~ He said: 
I wonder if this ground has anything to say: I wonder if 
the ground is listening to what is said. I wonder if the ground 
would come to life and what is on it: Though I hear what this 
earth says, the earth says, God has placed me here. The Earth 
says, that God tells me to take care of the Indians on this earth; 
the Earth says to the Indians that stop on the Earth feed them 
right. (p. 1.19) 
As he finished the argument he said, "God said. You Indians who 
take care of a certain portion of the country should not trade it off 
unless you get a fair price" (p. 1J9) .. The earth may have had a holy 
relationship to some Indians, but, at least in Young Chief's view, 
it did have a price. Young Chief ended his speech contrasting his 
position with that of Lawyer. He told the Commissioners, 
I walk as it were in the dark and cannot therefore take hold 
of what I do not see. Lawyer sees and he takes hold. When I 
come to understand your proposition then I shall take hold. 
(p. 11 9) 
Five Crows, another Cayuse chief, told the Commissioners that his 
heart was the same as Young Chief. Palmer then asked Peopeo Moxmox 
to speak for the Wal]a Wallas. He told the· Commissioners that he 
felt they had treated the Indians as children, offering them food 
and giving them no more respect than a feather. H~ then suggested 
to the Commissioners that the Council be ended and that the tribes 
and government meet at another time. He said: 
If you were to separate as we are now and appoint some 
other time we shalJ have no bad minds. Stop the whites from 
coming up here till after this talk, not to bring their axes 
with them. (p. 120) 
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He was telling the Commissioners that he was opposed to the proposal, 
but then he added a conciliatory note, indicating that he did not 
want the President to think he was saying or meaning ~'anything bad" 
(p. 120). He said that it was alright for the Whites to travel 
through his country "providing they do not build houses on our land" 
(p. 120). He told the Commissioners that he thought Lawyer had given 
up his lands, but that he wanted another meeting to discuss the 
proposal. "It is not only by one meeting that we can come to a 
decision" (p. 120), he said. He told the Commissioners he would 
meet with the next day and "towards evening I shall go home" (p. 120). 
Palmer asked Kamiakin to speak, and he said he had nothing 
to say. Palmer also asked if Young Chief or Peopeo Moxmox spoke for 
the Umatil]as. He got no response to the inquiry, but Owhi, a chief 
of the Yakimas responded. It was Owhi who gave the most eloquent and 
articulate statement of the Indian realtionship to the land. He said: 
Is the earth before the day or the day before the earth 
God was before the earth, the heavens were clear and good and 
all things in the heavens were good. God looked one way then 
the other and named our land for us to take care of. God made 
the other. We did not make the other, we did not make it, he 
made it to last forever. It is the earth that is our parent or 
it is God is our elder brother. This leads the Indians to ask 
where does this talk come from that you have been giving us. 
god made earth and it listens to him to know what he would 
decide, The almighty made us and gave us breath; we are talking 
together_and God hears all that we say today. God looks down 
upon his children today as if we were all in one body. He is 
going to make one body of us; we Indians present have listened 
to vour talk as if it came from God. God n~med this land to 
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us that is the reason I am afraid to say anything about this land. 
I am afraid of the laws of the Almighty, this is the reason I 
am afraid to speak of the land. I am afraid of the Almighty, 
that is the reason of my heart's being sad: this is the reason 
I cannot give you an answer. I am afraid of the Almighty. 
Shall I steal this land and sell it? (pp. 120-121) 
Owhi also indicated that he could not give a direct answer because 
many of the Yakimas who would be affected were not in Council. 
The government negotiators used persuasion as they attempted 
to answer the Indian objections. They asserted that God would not 
be angry with them if they sold the land, that the price of the land 
was more than it was worth, and that the Indians would be adequately 
taken care of on the reservation. 
Palmer was direct and abrupt, countering most of the spe-
cifics of the Indian argument. It was generally caustic in tone, 
perhaps indicating Palmer's frustration with the slow progress of the 
Council and the general oppostion of the Indians. 
Responding to Young Chief and Peopeo Moxmox, Palmer asked, 
Can we bring these saw mills and these grist milJs here on 
our backs to show these people? Can we bring these blacksmith 
shops, the wagons and tools on our back to show them at this time? 
Can we cause farms of wheat and of corn to spring up in a day 
that they may see it? Can we build these school houses and 
these dwellings in a day? Can we bring all the money that 
these things will cost that you may see it. It would be more 
than all the horses of any of these men could carry. (p. 121) 
But at this point Palmer turned more conciliatory, saying, "We come 
first to see you and make a bargain ... but whatever we agree to 
give you you will get" (p. 121). 
Palmer told the Indians that they were accepting bad counsel 
from those who were telling them not to accept the proposal. He said 
he and Stevens had come to offer a fair proposal, but that they 
(the Indians) had refused to "receive the light" (p. 121). He at-
tempted to lessen the Indians' value for the land, indicating that 
he loved the land of his birth, but had travelJed a great distance 
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to the Council, while the IDdians were being asked to move only a 
short distance to the new reservation. He added that much of the land 
was parched plain, and then rhetorically asked why the government 
was wil]ing to pay so much for this poor land. "It is because our 
Cheif has told us to take care of his red people" (p. 122). Palmer 
also reiterated the argument that there was bloodshed when the 
Whites and Indians lived together and suggested that the President 
had sent Stevens and himself to make the treaties before too many 
Whites were in the territory. 
Palmer concluded in his competitive stance by pressing for an 
-
agreement on the following day. He indicated that the Commissioners 
and the Nez Perce were in agreement and that the agreement would be 
perfected the following day. He added that he would feel sorry for the 
others if they accepted bad counsel and did not share in the benefits 
of the treaty. It is obvious that Palmer was using the proposed treaty 
with the Nez Perce as a strategic weapon to get agreement from all 
the tribes. Palmer made one last persuasive attempt to rally support, 
We want to help you to put food into your lodges and homes. 
We want to help you to get clothes and blankets to cover you 
from the storm; we want to help you to get arms and ammunition 
to kill game: we want to open your eyes and give you li~ht that 
you may see. We want to make you a good people. (p. 122) 
Camaspello, an aged chief of the UmatilJa band, said he was 
opposed to the proposal because the land being offered was mountainous. 
He added that he had worked dilligently to build his garden and home, 
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as he had been taught by the missionaries, and then he asked, "Will 
God think nothing of the Labor I have bestowed on my garden?" (p. 123). 
Howlish Wompoon, a chief of the Cayuse, was bitter in his 
denunciation of the proposal and the Commissioners. He told them 
that he had listened without impression and that he did not under-
stand the speeches. He said he knew the Nez Perce had given up their 
lands and that the Commissioners wanted the other tribes to go there. 
Then he bitterly added, "Your words since you came here have been 
crooked" (p. 123). 
Palmer responded to Camaspello, but ignored the remarks of 
Howlish Wompoon. He reiterated the original offer that any person 
who vacated improved property had the choice of having the same 
imporvements provided on the reservation or they would be paid in cash. 
He added that the Commissioners were not asking the Indians to move 
where they would sarve and the added, " ... if there is not good 
land enough in the reservation to make them farms we will make it 
larger" (p. 123). For the first time, Palmer was indicating that 
there was some flexibility in the government proposals and evidence 
of a search process for an acceptable alternative. 
While Palmer was offering some flexibility, Stevens did not 
take the same position. He told the Council that Palmer and he had 
talked straight and asked, "Have all of you talked straight" (p. l.?3). 
He added that Lawyer and his people had and "their business will be 
done tomorrow" (pp. 123-124). He then launched into an attack on the 
other chiefs, asking them where their hearts were. When he got to 
Kamiakin he said, 
And Kam-a-sh-kan the great cheif of the Yakamas has not 
spoken at al]. His people have had no voice here today. He 
is not ashamed to speak--he is not afraid to speak--then speak 
out. (p. 124) 
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It was an obvious taunt to force Kamiakin to respond in some way. It 
also, it would seem, indicated that Stevens was frustrated by Kamiakin's 
refusal to speak. When Stevens responded to Owhi's statement that he 
could not speak because many of his people were not present, Stevens 
became belJ igeren t, saying, "Owhi says his people are not here. Why 
did he promise to come here to hear our talk" (p. 124). He finished his 
tirade telJing the Indians that he expected to hear from the Indians 
and "the papers we will have drawn up tonight. You can see them tomorrow. 
The Nez Perce must not be put off any longer, their business must be 
dispatched" (p. 124). 
Palmer followed Stevens and attempted to establish a more pleasant 
mood for the Council whPn he quoted Peopeo Moxmox as saying that they 
had met as friends and that they should not say anything that was bad. 
Peopeo Moxmox was quoted as saying, 
We have been friends a long time. I hope we shall always 
remain friends, and as brothers. When we part we will 
part as friends. Then let us act as friends and as wise 
men. (p. 124) 
Palmer's efforts seemed to pay off as Five Crows, a Cayuse chief, called 
for some positive action. He said; 
Listen to me you Cheifs. We have been as one people 
with the Nez Perces heretofore; this day we are divided. 
We the Cayuses, Walla Wallas, and Kam-a-ah-kans people 
and others will think over the matter tonight and give 
, you an answer tomorrow. P. 124) 
With that the Council session ended for th~ day with pleasantries 
being expressed by Palmer and Stevens. 
Day 11, Friday, June 8, 1855 
It appeared that an agreement would be reached during this session 
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as the government negotiators presented a new proposal calling for a 
separate reservation for the Cayuse, Walla WalJas and UmatilJa bands. 
The Indians responded positively to this proposal, but then Looking 
Glass, an aged chief of the Nez Perce, was reported returning from the 
buffalo country and the session ended without official acceptance. 
As we look at the actions of the negotiators during this session 
we see that the emphasis is on search and strategy and only limited time 
is spent on persuasion. Also, we see for the first time the cooperative 
mode of interaction. The government offer of the thjrd reservation was 
a strategic act. That is, the government talked about manipulating 
an event under its control. 
The reservation was to be located on the headwaters of the Umatilla 
River, which was at the base of the Blue Mountains. It is uncertain 
exactly how and when the Commissioners decided the scope of the reser-
vations. The official record does not make notation of the new offer 
until it was presented in Council on Friday afternoon. However, Stevens 
indicates that "conferences were had with the cusant cheifs separately, 
the proposition of a reservation in their own country was broached, and 
the whole ground of the treaties again gone over and fully discussed" 
(Stevens, 1900, p. 53). Palmer and Stevens may have met with the chiefs 
individually on Thursday night, or it may have been Friday morning, as 
the Council, according to Kip, did not begin unti] 3 p.m. (Kip, 1897, p. 23) 
Also, Peopeo Moxmox said that he had talked with Palmer in the morning, 
when he discussed the offer later in Council. In any event, the deal 
had been partially struck during the unofficial negotiations. 
It is obvious that the government negotiators went through 
the search process prior to entering the new proposal into the negotiations. 
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In effect, the negotiators realized that they were not going to get a 
treaty if they maintained the original proposal. As a result, they 
searched for alternatives that would give them their ultimate goal--peace 
in the area and open lands for settlement by Whites. The additional 
reservation was an alternative invented by the government negotiators 
which was acceptable to the Indians and preferable to the other avail-
able outcome--no treaty. The evidence suggests that the search process 
was triggered by the rejection of the oririnal proposal. As long as 
the eovernment negotiators did not get a direct response from the Indians 
they continued to press for acceptance of the original proposal. When the 
Indians finally responded, and when it was totally negative--with the 
exception of the Nez Perce--the Commissioners began to search for some 
new alternative. It would seem, therefore, that the rejection of offers 
is necessary to create search. Also, in this case, it would seem that 
the rejection must be understood and accepted by the parties making the 
offer. It may also be argued that the intensity and certainty of the 
rejection may help to trigger the search process more rapidly. 
There was limited use of persuasion. Stevens stressed the 
amount of money that was going to be paid to the Yakimas for their land, 
indicating that the offer was a good one. Therefore, he was attempting 
to alter the Yakima's perception of the proposal. It should be noted 
h~re that the creation of the third reservation did not affect the 
Yakimas directly, inasmuch as they had been promised a reservation of 
their own in the ori?inal proposal. However, the creation of the 
additional reservation precluded the possibility of any other tribes 
being placed with them. 
During this session we also see the government negotiators and 
the Indians acting in the cooperative mode for the first time. There 
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is an accurate assessment of the alternatives identified and the pre-
ferences among the alternatives and the self-perceived importance of 
the issues. In addition, there was a general de-emphasis on the impor-
tance of the interpersonal relationships, additional offers were trans-
mitted, and there was some tentativeness to their presentation. Specific-
ally, the Indians were willing to tell the government how they felt about 
specific areas for reservations and they honestly indicated their pre-
ferences for the location of homes and farms, thus indicating accurate 
assessment among alternatives open to them. For the government's part, 
the willingness to transmit a new offer indicates less rigidity of 
position. The same lessening of rigidity is shown in the 'offer to have 
the Yakimas negotiate a fair price for their lands. The dropping of 
the threat that Indians suffered when integrated with Whites is also a 
cooperative strategy. 
The key to ending the stalemate was the decision by the Commis-
sioners that an additional reservation would have to be developed. The 
offer was an admission that the government negotiators could not attain 
their first preferred alternative. Analogously, the Indian decision to 
accept the new offer indicates that they had decided that they could not 
attain their first preferred alternative--no reservation and no infJux 
of Whites into the area. Therefore, we can look at the agreement as the 
saddle point, the point where each side could accept the agreement. 
Stevens opened the Council saying, "My friends, judging from 
your faces, I think you see your way clear," and then went on to say, 
"We expect that Young Chief, that Pee-pee-mox-mox and Kam-a-ah-kan will 
speak now, and we hope that with them the business may be concluded" 
(Slickpoo and Walker, 1974, p. 123). A change in Indian attitude was 
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evident in the first response by Young Chief. He said, "We have been tiring 
one another for a long time" (p. 125), and then went on to tell the 
Commissioners that the reason the Indians had objected was that they 
did not understand and the reason they did not understand was" •.. that 
you selected this country for us to live in without our having any 
voice in the matter" (p. 125). He continued on in a conciliatory tone, 
indicating that he would show "lands that I will give you, we will then 
take good care of each other" {p. 125). He added, "we will see when 
you make another offer whether we can agree to it. Wait, we may come 
to an agreement when we see your offer ... " (p. 125). As he concluded 
he said, "I think the land where my forefathers are buried bhould be 
mine; that is the place I am speaking for'' (p. 125}. Young Chief was 
aware that another offer was coming. 
Palmer immediately unfolded the government's new proposition. 
He said, "We have thought of your words," and continued, "We desired 
first to have you go all to one place, but to show you that we wish to 
do you good I wil] make you another proposition" ( p. 126). He then 
detailed the reservation and other services that were to be provided by 
the government in return for the Indians moving onto the reservations. 
The proposal was similar to the earlier proposals in that it included 
the sawmil]s and flour mills, schools, a hospital and payments to the 
Chiefs. Palmer also attempted to "sweeten the pot" for Peopeo Moxmox, 
indicating that he would receive a $500 payment, three yoke of oxen, 
a wagon and two plows. Palmer said these additional gifts were to be 
given because Peopeo Moxmox was the only chief who would have to move 
from the land he currently occupied. 
After outlining the provisions, Palmer pushed for the acceptance 
of the new proposal. He said, 
I have offered you more than your country is worth--
more than you know how to count. How long will it take 
you to decide? If you say it is good the papers can be 
arranged tonight, tomorrow they can be signed; we would 
then give you these goods and you could go home with a 
good heart. (p. 127) 
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Peopeo Moxmox spoke briefly, indicating that he had accepted the 
offer, and that the deal had been struck in the earlier negotiations. He 
said, 
I have already spoken all that I have to say--I and 
Gen. Palmer this morning. They have already written all 
that we have said. I spoke this morning about having 
a little house, a place to sell my cattle on the other 
side of the Columbia where my cattle range for a trading 
post when the Americans pass. (p. 127) 
Palmer responded, indicating that he had agreed to all of the provisions. 
Everything seemed to be moving toward agreement, but then, as Kip 
put it, "suddenly a new explosive element dropped into this little political 
caldron" (Kip, 1897, p. 23). A runner came ivto Council indicating that 
Looking Glass was coming to Council after a long trip into the buffalo 
country. Looking Glass was considered the war chief of the Nez Perce, 
according ~o Kip (p. 23). The official record does not indicate the 
same excitement as Kip, but rather shows Stevens acknowledging the 
approaching ~rrival of Lookin~ Glass and moving on. 
Stevens pressed for acceptance and asked Skloom, one of the 
Yakima chiefs, to respond. Skloom questioned the price of the land to 
be given up by the Indians. He indicated that some land had been sold by 
Whites for $800 per mile but that other lands were sold for $40 per mi1e. 
He concluded, "My friends, I have understood what you have said; when 
you give me what is just for my land you shall have it" (S1ickpoo and 
Walker, 1g74, p. 128). Stevens replied that the amount to be paid to 
the Yakimas would be a good price. He indicated that some lands had 
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been sold for $800 per mile but that price had not been in the Yakima's 
country. Stevens then urged Skloom, Kamiakin and Owhi to make their own 
proposal and indicate where they wanted their homes to be built. With 
the approach of Looking Glass the session ended. 
When Looking Glass arrived at the Council he soon made his dis-
pleasure known. He objected to the sale of the Nez Perce lands. HP said, 
My people, what have you done? While I was gone, 
you have sold my country. I have come home, and there 
is not l~ft me a place on which to pitch my lodge. Go 
home to your lodges. I will talk to you. (Stevens, 1900, 
p. 54) 
Stevens reported that he consulted with Lawyer following the session and 
he (lawyer) indicated that Looking Glass would calm down and accept 
the treaty in a day or two. At the same time, Stevens reported (p. 55) 
that Lawyer told him that the return of Looking Glass would preclude 
reducing the size of the Nez Perce reservation, which would be reduced 
because it was originally scheduled to be the home of the Cayuses, 
Walla Wallas and Umatillas, and they now had their own reservation. 
Although Stevens records this (p. 55), the official record does not 
indicate that this was taken up in Council. In any case, the final 
reservation was the same as originally offered. There has been specu-
lation that Lawyer and Looking Glass might have been involved in a 
conspiracy to force the government to leave the Nez Perce reservation 
in its original size. This speculation is disputed by Josephy (1965, 
p. 329). The fact that Looking Glass had been in the buffalo country 
for nearly three years makes it unlikely that the Lawyer-Looking Glass 
conspiracy theory has any merit. 
Day 12, Saturday, June 9. 1855 
What had taken nearly two weeks to put together now seemed to 
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be coming apart. With the return of Looking Glass, the authority of 
Lawyer as the head chief of the Nez Perce was in question, and with it, 
the NP.z Perce support for the proposed treaty. Lookjng Glass continued 
to oppose the treaty and offered his own suggestions for the territory to 
be included in the reservations and gained the support of the Cayuse. 
As a result, the signing of the treaty had to be put off until Monday. 
During this twelfth day of bargaining we see that the Commissioners 
spend the bulk of their time defending themselves from Looking Glass' 
~uestions and reiterating government commitments. In addition, they 
pressed for an end to the Council, which~ of course, required the signing 
of the treaties. In the case of Looking Glass we see a good deal of 
search and strategy activity, as well as a concerted effort to change the 
procedures of the bargaining. 
The Commissioners outlined positions that had already bP.en agreed 
upon and restated details of the treaties and assured the Indians that 
the commitments included would be carried out. There was very little 
persuasive action on the part of the Commissioners. Although they were 
attempting to get Looking Glass to accept the treaty, they did not push 
the values of the treaty to him, but simply indicated that it had been 
agreed to by others. An exception was Palmer's explanation of the 
reasons for hurrying to get the treaty signed. He used the example of 
gaining peace with the Blackfeet to convince Looking Glass that there was 
value in the work that was underway. 
Looking Glass searched for additional alternatives and took the 
strategic action of suggesting additional territories for the reser-
vations. He was not accepting the initial offer, but with changes in the 
reservation boundaries, the treaty would be acceptable. The lines 
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proposed by Looking Glass outlined the territories the various tribes 
claimed as their homelands. He was asking the government to buy his 
homeland and then return it to him in the form of the reservation, including 
all of the promised improvements and services. The point was not missed 
by Palmer. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the day's bargaining was 
the battle for control of the procedures. From the perspective of 
Beisecker's model, we can see that the Council returned to a highly 
competitive mode with the arguments between Looking Glass and the 
Commissioners. Central to the procedure battle was Looking Glass' 
argument that the President should first agree with the particular 
treaty and then the Indians would have the right to accept or reject it. 
The Commissioners had been arguing throughout the Council that the proce-
dure would be that the Indians sign the treaty, and thP.n if the President 
approved, it would be executed. When Looking Glass suggested the rever-
sal in procedure, Stevens said it "cannot be any other way" (SJickpoo 
and Walker, 1974, p. 132). Stevens and Looking Glass understood that the 
party that had the last chance to accept or reject the treaty had the 
upper hand. The winner in this case would seem to be the Commissioners 
as they were not forced to accede to Looking Glass' demand for the new 
procedure. Other evidence of the competitive mode were continued demands 
of the Commissioners to have the treaty signed as it had been agreed upon 
and the outright rejection of Looking G]ass' new reservation lines. 
Stevens opened the Council by announcing that the Commissioners 
and the Yakimas had reached an agreement. With the announcement Stevens 
indicated what was included in each treaty document and' told the Counci] 
that the provisions, except for the amount of payment, were the same for 
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each of the three reservations. He said that the original sum of 
$350,000 that had been proposed for the reservation that included all of 
the Nez Perce, Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umati]las had been split because 
of the change in proposals. The Nez Perce were to now receive $200,000 
and the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatillas were to receive $150,000. 
Stevens indicated that the Yakimas were about the same number as the 
Nez Perce, and therefore would receive the same amount as the Nez Perce--
$200,000. 
Stevens outlined the items that were contained in the treaty, 
indicating that all of the treaties had the same components. These 
components were: 
1. The names of the Iudians who signed the treaty. 
2. The description of the lands originally held by 
the Indians. 
3. The reservations onto which the Indians would move. 
4. The timetable for movement onto the reservation--
the Indians would have two to three years, as the 
President and Congress had to approve the treaty. 
5. The Indian right to gather berries and roots, 
fish and kilJ game was assurred. 
6. The payment schedule, including the salaries, 
houses and acreages for the Chiefs. 
Then Stevens added three additional provisions that had not pre-
viously been mentioned in Council. These provisions may have been dis-
cussed when he met with the chiefs in private, as no objection was voiced. 
These provisions were: 
1. If any Indian got into debt. the payment could 
not be taken to satisfy the debt. 
2. The Indians promised to be friendly to each other 
and to the Whites. 
3. The Indians were not to drink whiskey and were 
to do al] they could to prevent others from drink-
ing it. The penalty for this would be that the 
annuities would not be paid. 
These provisions were consistent with the government policy of 
protecting the Indians, even though we would certainly label them as 
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paternalistic. 
Stevens askP.d if anyone would like to have the treaties read, 
and with this Looking Glass responded. He challenged the Commissioners, 
arguing that they had no right to disrupt the lives of his people and 
that he was the leader of the Nez Perce people. He stressed the Indian 
relationship to the land, and the role of the lands as a gift from God. 
He told the Commissioners that he had not gone to the President's land 
to tramp on it and that "I do not expect anyone to tramp on mine" (p. 130). 
He followed with a parallel argument when he questioned, "Why do you want 
to separatJ my children and scatter them all over the country? I do 
not go into your country and scatter your children in every direction" 
(p. 130). Then he asserted his leadership, 
It is for me to speak for thP.se people my children, 
that is what I say. The Big Cheif speaks to his children 
and I also speak to my children and tell thP.m what to do; 
and that is what we are talking about; you see where the 
sun is. I never go where the Whites are and mix with 
them and talk with them. I am already named from above, 
by the Supreme Being, my heart is with the country, I 
live upon and head, that is the reason my heart tells 
me to say where my children shall go. (p. 130) 
He continued to spar with the Commissioners, asking how long the agent 
would stay and if the agent would keep the Whites out. The Commissioners 
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assured him that the agent would stay in the country, "as long as there 
are people" (p. 130), and that the agent would keep the Whites out. 
What occurred next is uncertain, but succeeding events would indi-
cate that Looking Glass took a strategic action, drawing the line on the 
maps that called for the Nez Perce reservation to be all of the lands that 
the Nez Perce originally claimed as their homelands. Looking Glass 
asked the Commissioners, if the agent would keep the Whites out? Palmer 
said, "certainly" (P. 130), but this did not placate Looking Glass as he 
responded: 
It is not for nothing I am speaktng to my cheifs, it 
is to talk straight, it is just as if I were to see the 
President and talk to him it would be straight, that is 
just what I want, that you talk straight from the Presi-
dent. Look at my talk. I am going to talk strai~ht. 
When I hear your talk it,goes to my heart. I am not like 
those people (pointing about) who hang their heads and 
say nothing. We will have a short talk, not a long one. 
(pp. 130-132) 
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The official record indicates that there was silence for several 
minutes, and then Young Chief spoke, supporting Looking Glass, saying 
"That is the reason I told the Governor to let it be till another time, 
till we know what the Looking Glass would say" (1974, p. 132). Stevens 
indicated that the Commissioners would wait to hear from Looking Glass. 
He soon was speaking again, and this time, in what seemed to be a show 
of support for Young Chief, he outlined a new and bigger reservation in 
the Cayuse country, and then asked what was the time frame for building 
the mills on the reservations. Stevens replied that the mills would 
be built "the year they move on, when the President approved the treaty" 
(p. 132). 
Looking Glass then attempted to change the procedures, telling 
Stevens, 
You said you would send this talk 
and if he says yes, then it is right. 
listen what the President says and if 
then we will talk. (p. 132) 
to the President 
Yes and I wil 1 
he says yes, 
Looking Glass was telling the Commissioners that he wanted the procedure 
reversed. Stevens repeated that everything agreed to in Council would 
be sent to the President and argued that some type of agreement had to 
be reached before anything could go to the President, and then he said, 
"I ask Looking Glass to look upon it and see that it cannot be any other 
way" (p. 132). Looking Glass dropped the argument. 
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Palmer attempted to support Stevens, indicating that thP. Yakimas, 
Wal]a Wallas, Cayuse and Umatillas had accepted the treaty. He charged, 
"If we change the line to where he says, we would have to stay here two 
or three more days to arrange the paper" (p. 133). Then he pressed for 
acceptance, rebuking the Indians, "Shall we say one thing today and 
another thing tomorrow?" (p. 133). Palmer indicated that the lines shown 
the day before should bP. followed, and no more time wasted. Evidently 
there was a miscommunication as Looking Glass replied, "Yes! Let it 
be so" (p. 133). 
Looking Glass continued to oppose the action, telling the 
Commissioners that he had expanded the lines of the reservation; because 
the people had many horses and cattle and needed the extra space. He then 
told thP.m that if they would accept the new lines, he would agree to the 
proposal. Stevens and Looking Glass continued to argue over the proposal 
and then Stevens attempted to push the Council to an end, asking for the 
Indians to sign. Looking Glass responded as if the agreement included 
the new lines of the reservation. "I said yes to the line I marked myself, 
not to your line" and Stevens said, "I will say to Looking Glass, we 
cannot agree" (P. 134). 
Palmer once more came to Stevens' support, saying, "I would say 
to the Looking Glass, what use is it to purchase his country and give it 
all back again?" (p. 134). Then, perhaps frustrated by the failure to 
sway Looking Glass, Palmer said, "We do not come here to talk Jike boys. 
shall we like boys say yes today and no tomorrow?" (p. 134), and then he 
stressed that Peopeo Moxmox, Young Chief and the Nez Perce had agreed to 
the original lines. Young Chief fired back, "The President is your Chief 
and you do what he tells you. That is the reason the Looking GJass marked 
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out the line he wanted: He is the head chief" (p. 135). Looking Glass 
added that he did not see what the hurry was to reach a decision. 
Palmer once more attempted to persuade Looking Glass by indicating 
that he and Stevens had other people to see, including the Blackfeet so 
that there would be peace in the buffalo country. Here, Palmer was 
pointing directly to the benefits for Looking Glass. Looking Glass had 
had his horses stolen on his most recent trip to the buffalo country and 
had to spend a good deal of time and kill at least two Blackfeet in order 
to get them back. 
In one last effort to get the treaties signed, Palmer changed his 
tactics. Palmer took the'position of bargaining from weakness. He told 
the Council, 
If we were to say yes to his line our Cheif would say 
No! But if we shall say the line we have marked we be-
lieve our Cheif will say yes. Which will you do, take 
that line or have it all thrown away? Let us act like 
wise men and not part without doing good for each other. 
(p. 136) 
Thus, Palmer was telling the Indians that he could not agree to the new 
lines proposed by Looking Glass because the President would not approve. 
Looking Glass then said he would say no more today, and Stevens 
evidently felt that it would be fruitless to argue any longer. He indi-
cated that the treaties for the Yakimas, the Walla Wallas, the Cayuse and 
the Umatillas were ready and they could be signed that night if the 
chiefs wished. With that he called the next session for Monday morning. 
As the week ended, progress had been made in developing a treaty, but the 
outcome was uncertain as Looking Glass led the opposition. 
Following the close of the official sessi-0n on Saturday, June 9,-
Peopeo Moxmox of the Walla Wallas and Kamiakin of the Yakimas led the 
chiefs of their respective tribes in signing the treaties that affected 
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them., The treaties were signed as the Nez Perce and Cayuse continued to 
discuss the issue among thPmselves. 
Stevens wrote in his diary that Lawyer came to him later in the 
evening, and that Lawyer had berated him for not sustaining him as head 
chief of the Nez Perce. Stevens (1900) reported that Lawyer said, 
When he (Looking Glass) said, "I, the head cheif, 
have just got back: I will talk~ the boys talked yester-
day," you might have replied, "the Lawyer and not you, is 
the head cheif. The whole Nez Perce tribe have said in 
council Lawyer was the head cheif. Your faith is pledged. 
You have agreed to the treaty. I call upon you to sign 
it." Had this course been taken the treaty would have 
been sirned. (p. 56) 
Stevens responded to Lawyer, who had left the Council session during one 
of Looking Glass' speeches, that he (Stevens) believed Looking Glass' 
speeches were the "outpourings of an angry and excited old man, whose 
heart would become all right if left to himself for a time" (p. 56). 
And then Stevens indicated that he believed that Lawyer's departure was 
a signal that "nothing more can be done today" (p. 56). Finally, Stevens 
told Lawyer that it was his job to intervene if that was necessary, but 
that Stevens would sustain Lawyer as the head chief of the Nez Perce. 
He told Lawyer, 
Your authority will be sustained and your people will 
be called upon to keep their word. You will be sustained. 
The Looking Glass will not be allowed to speak as head 
cheif. You, and you alone will be recognized. Should 
Looking Glass persist, the appeal will be made to your 
people. They must sign the treaty agreed to by them 
through you as head cheif, or the council will be broken 
up and you will return home, your faith broken, your 
hopes for the future gone. (p. 57) 
With that assurance Lawyer left and returned to his camp where the Nez 
Perce were holding a council among themselves. Stevens reporterr that 
the Nez Perce determined "that the position of Looking Glass was to be 
second to that of Lawyer" (p. 57). 
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Day 13, Sunday, June 10, 1855 
No Council session was held as the Commissioners observed Sunday, 
as did a number of the Nez Perce bands. 
Day 14, Monday, June 11. 1855 
It is unclear what occurred between Lawyer's visit on Saturday 
night and the opening of the Council session on Monday. But, when the 
Council session opened Looking Glass had dropped his opposition and sat 
next to Lawyer. Perhaps as plausible an explanation as any can be found 
in the observation of Kip (1899). He wrote in his diary, 
•.. he asked the chiefs to come forward and sign the 
papers. This they all did without the least opposition. 
What he has been doing with Looking Glass since last 
Saturday, we cannot imagine, but we suppose savage 
nature in the wilderness is the same as civilized nature 
was in England in Walpole's day, and "every man has his 
price." (p. 26) 
Extant documents do not indicate that Looking Glass was given special 
inducement's to sign, but the opposition was gone and the treaties were 
signed by thP. Nez Perce and the Cayuse. Lawyer si~ned first for the 
Nez Perce, followed by Looking Glass and the other head men of the bands. 
There was no bargaining during the final day of the Council. 
Stevens called for the signin~. The Indians signed and then the Com-
missioners spoke of thP.ir appreciation and a few of the Indians made 
brief remarks of acceptance and goodwill. Notably, Lawyer and Looking 
Glass did not speak. 
Thus, the Council adjourned sine die. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
This chapter provides an analysis of the success and failures 
of the parties to the negotiations. We shalJ base the analysis on 
the final documents negotiated. even though we know the agreements 
were not carried out. We shall not consider whether the agreements 
should or could have been carried out. 
We shall analyze the successes and failure of each of the 
parties to the negotiation and then consider the implications of the 
results. The criteria for success in bargaining will be the achieve-
ment of the event or events for which a party held high utiJity. 
That is to say that any party gaining security for an event of high 
utility has achieved a relative amount of success in the bargaining 
process. 
The Government Negotiators 
The government negotiators were relatively successful in 
this Council, despite the fact that they were forced into conceding 
an additional reservation for the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatilla 
bands. As we indicated earlier, the event of highest utility for 
the government negotiators was the signing of a treaty that would 
open large areas for White settlement and at the same time maintain 
peace with the Indians so that the settlement would not be interupted 
by war and threats of war. The negotiated treaties gave the United 
States government title to 60,000 square milPs of territory that had 
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previously been under Indian control (Slickpoo and Walker, 1974, p. 143). 
Under the treaty, the Nez Perce had agreed to go onto a reservation of 
about 5,000 square miles; the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatilla bands, 
a reservation of about 800 square miles; and the Yakimas and other tribes, 
a reservation of about 1,900 square miles. 
If there was a failure on the part of the government nego-
tiators, it was their failure to get the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatilla 
bands to move onto the reservation in the Nez Perce country. This outcome, 
of course, was the government's first offer. 
The key to the success of the government negotiators would 
seem to have been a combination of search and strategy. The search 
was for the third reservation for the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatilla 
band. The commitment was their willingness to enter the reservation 
into the negotiations. Stevens and Palmer spent the first eight days 
of the Council attempting to get the Indians to accept the offer of 
two reservations. D~spite the commitments of mills, teachers and supplies, 
and other persuasive attempts, the Indians did not accept the offer 
of the two reservations, and after talking among themselves on the 
ninth day, they returned to Council on the tenth day and vehemently 
rejected the proposals for the two reservations. Following that 
rejection the government negotiators searched for the additional 
reservation and when it was offered the Indians accepted. 
Once the third reservation was entered into the negotiations, 
there was no attempt by the government negotiators to use additional 
strategy or persuasion. To the contrary, the government negotiators 
simply entered the offer into the negotiations, and did not attempt 
to exaggerate the benefits of the offer, a practice of competitive 
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behavior which the negotiators had attemp~ed when introducing earlier 
offers. 
Further evidence of the importance of the third reservation 
comes from the behavior of the Indians f0llowiPg the return of Lookivg 
Glass. If, as Stevens has argued, the key to gaining a treaty was 
the support of the Nez Perce, the negotiations should have been dis-
rupted when the Nez Perce became splintered on Looking Glass' return. 
Despite the fact that the Nez Perce support seemed in doubt, the other 
tribes continued to live up to their verbal agreement to accept the 
treaty with the third reservation. It would seem, therefore, that the 
third reservation, not Nez Perce approval, was the key to the acceptance 
by the other tribes. 
Another strategic effort of the government negotiators--
the threat that the Indians would be wiped out if White-Indian ivter-
action was not controlJed--may have had an impact on the negotiations. 
Slickpoo and Walker (1974) argue that: 
In spite of the statements made by the Indian leaders, 
they really signed the treaties because they were told that 
their lands would be overrun by white settlers if they refused 
the treaty proposals. Their past experience with missionaries, 
traders, and sett]ers made them believe that this was a real 
possibility. (pp. 142-143) 
The argument, however, is left unsupported by documentation. 
There is no extant evidence to indicate that the Indians 
were affected by the government negotiators' attempts at persuasion. 
Although Stevens and Palmer made extended arguments about the value 
of the mills, education and other services, there is no evidence 
to ind1cate that this had any measurab~e impact on the Indians. 
A§ we have indicated earlier, the negotiators spent the first eight 
days attempting to estabJish the value of their offer, but these 
offers were rejected by the Indians, with the exception of the Nez 
Perce. 
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From the evidence cited above, it would seem that the critical 
event leading to the government success was their willingness to search 
for an additional alternative--the third reservation. 
The Nez Perce 
The Nez Perce situation is somewhat more compljcated than the 
government situation, but the evidence indicates that the Nez Perce 
were very successful in Council. However, this success may not have 
been of their own making. It would seem that the Nez Perce people 
and Lawyer, their leader, may have had different utilities. The bulk 
of the Nez Perce people held a high utility for the land, and this 
position is well illustrated in the Council speeches of looking Glass 
on his return from the buffalo grounds. Lawyer, on the other hand, 
may have been more interested in retaining his position as head chief 
of the Nez Perce. We shall develop these arguments below. 
In the final treaty the Nez Perce received a reservation of 
about 5.000 square mi]es, and the territorv included most of the 
lands to which the Nez Perce h~d laid claim to prior to the Council. 
To this extent, one could argue that the Nez Perce were successful 
in the Council. However, as we analyze the proceedings, we see 
that the final outcome was largely the result of the rejection of 
the initial offers by the Walla Wa]las, C~yuse and Umatillas. It 
will be remembered that the initial goverment offer placed these 
tribes on a joint reservation with the Nez Perce in the Nez Perce 
country. It was only after the vehement rejection of that offer b:, 
the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatillas that the third reservation 
was proposed. Lawyer, as leader of the Nez PPrce, djd not object 
to th~ initial offer and even offered to accept it. If the other 
tribes had not objected and all of the tribes had been placed on the 
single reservation, the Nez Perce would h~ve fared significantly 
less well in Council. 
Although Lawyer seemed to be.a dupe of the government nego-
tiators through much of the negotiations, he did make one significant 
strategic move which assured the Nez Perce the large area included 
iv the final treaty. After the government negotiators had offered 
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the separate reservation for the WRlla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatillas, 
Stevens toJd Lawyer that the government would now have to reduce the 
size of the original reservation suggested for the Nez Perce country. 
Lawyer responded by telling Stevens that Looking Glass would not accept 
a reduction and that the entire deal would come apart if the government 
attempted to reduce the size of the rceservation. The government 
/ 
apparently did not wish to risk the possibility of not getting the 
treaty with the Nez Perce and left the origiPal offer ivtact. As we 
have indicated earlier, there are some historians who have argued that 
Looking Glass and Lawyer may have been in conspiracy here, but historians 
now discount this theory. 
Walker (1968) argues that Lawyer was an "acculturational 
opportunist" (p. 45), and used the Counci] to assure his position within 
the tribe. There is evidence to support this position in the work of 
Stevens (1900) where he indicates that Lawyer left the Council when 
Looking Glass began to speak and also that Lawyer came to his (Stevens) 
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tent later in the evening demanding that he (Lawyer) be recognized 
as the leader of the Nez Perce by the government negotiators (pp. 55-56). 
As a result of these arguments, some historians have branded Lawyer as 
a traitor to his people. 
There is, however, a second argument, which places Lawyer in 
a somewhat more positive light. This argument fol]ows the liP-e 
suggested earlier in this chapter by Slickpoo and Walker, and that 
is that Lawyer understood what happened when Indian-White interactions 
\ 
were left uncontrolled--the Indians suffered and died. It is likely 
that Lawyer had heard and understood these arguments, as he made 
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reference to this in his speech on Thursday, June 7. If Lawyer truly 
believed that the NPZ Perce would be destroyed if they did not have 
a treaty, then it may be argued that he showed great wisdom in working 
toward a treaty. However, his willingness to accept the WalJa Wallas, 
Cayuse and Umatillas on the same reservation casts doubt on his motives 
and/or his strategic wisdom. 
Although it may be argued that Lawyer's performance in 
Council was ambiguous, it cannot be denied that the NPZ Perce fared 
well in the final outcome. They maintained nearly all of the lands 
they had laid claim to and had received promises of money, services 
and protection from intrusion by the Whites. The key to this 
success would not seem to lie with the Nez Perce actions, but with 
the Walla Wal]as, Cayuse and Umatilla rejection of a joint reservation. 
The Other Tribes 
Perhaps the most successful of the bargainers at the Counc~l 
were the leaders of the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umati]las, especially 
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Peopeo Moxmox, Young Chief and Owhi. It was their rejection of the 
government's proposal of a joint reservation for them in the Nez Perce 
country that triggered the search for the additional reservation. 
In their speeches rejecting the government's original offer 
they spelled out their utilities, indicating that the highest value 
was for lands in their home country. In doing so, they provided the 
government with the option that would allow for a successful negotiation. 
When the government considered their obJection and came forth with an 
offer that included a reservation in their home country, the Walla 
Wallas, Cayuse and Umatillas accepted. Although these tribes gave up 
substantial portions of lands they claimed prior to the Council, the 
reservation in their home country was of substantially greater value 
than a shared reservation in the Nez Perce country. 
The key to the success of the Walla Wallas, UmatilJas and 
Cayuse was their strategic move of rejecting the offer of the govern-
ment. Their unified rejection, strongly issued in Council, convinced 
the government negotiators that they could not reach agreement on the 
terms originally offered. As a result, the government negotiators 
returned with the additional reservation and dissolved the deadlock. 
This change was beneficial to the Walla Wallas, Cayuse and Umatillas, 
and also the Nez Perce. 
As we look at the completed treaty it would seem that each 
party to the negotiations was relatively successful. That is, they 
gained some of the events which they held in highest utility. Obviously, 
the Indians would have preferred to have been left alone,'- However, 
this goal was unrealistic and unattainable in light of American 
policy of that period. We might. argue that the policy supporting 
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settlement of the area was wrong, but as long as that was the policy, 
the Whttes were going to continue to encroach on the Indian lands. 
Implications 
Our analysis of the bargaining in the Counci] sessions in-
dicates that this was truly a mixed-motive situation. Th~t is, each 
of the parties to the bargaining had the opportunity to gain and lose 
from the outcome of the interaction. 
This runs counter to many popular perceptions that the 
treaty bargaining sessions were shams in which the government nego-
tiators simply told the Indians that certain agreements were going 
to be reached or the Indians were going to be exterminated. The manner 
in which the government negotiators controlJed the conduct of the Council 
leaves little doubt that they felt that they were bargaining from a 
position of superiority. However, our analysis shows that the Indians 
did not allow this perceived position of power to control events.-
The Indians did reject the original offers, and did force concessions 
from the government negotiators. In addition, Looking Glass attempted 
to gain control of the bargaining procedures when he tried to force 
Stevens to take the treaty to the President for his signature before 
having it submitted to the Indians for their approval. Stevens re-
jected that move, but the action on Looking Glass' part would indicate 
that the Indians understood the nature of the bargaining process and 
the advantage that was present with having the last option to sign. 
Obviously, the Indians were not totally powerless, uninformed parties 
to the negotiations. 
The implication of this would be that the negotiated treaty 
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is a valid instrument for defining the relationship between the govern-
ment and the various tribes which were parties to the treaties. 
Therefore, the questions concerning the relationship of the United 
States government to thP. tribes should not be couched in terms of the 
validity of the treaty and the treaty making process, but, rather the 
questions should be couched in terms of whether the provisions of the 
treaties were carried out by the signatory parties. We know, of course, 
that the provisions were not honored in total by any of the parties. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
The continuing questions about government-Indian relationships 
based on treaties signed over the past two hundred years provides a 
wealth of territory for additional study. It would seem that the 
additional study of treaty bargaining sessions would give light to the 
processes by which the agreements were reached. If we can analyze the 
processes in terms of the value structures present at the time of the 
negotiations we may be able to better understand why and how thP. particu-
lar agreements were reached. 
It would also seem that the analysis that we have conducted here 
could also be applied to current bargaining situations. One of the 
frustrations of this study has been the absence of extant records to 
indicate what kind of thinking was going on in the minds of the Indian 
negotiators. A fruitful extention of this form of analysis would seem 
to be situations where the researcher can gain access to the attitudes 
of al] parties as the negotiations are continuing. In this way 
the questions of utility could be answered more precisely. Also, 
questions related to perceived power relationships could be explored. 
The research could be studies of on-going negotiations in the field, 
or in the experimental la~oratories. 
Final Note 
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We have seen that the Council at Walla Walla was a mixed-motive 
situation and that the models of Cohen and Beisecker were effective 
tools for analyzing the actions within the Council. We saw that the 
parties bargained to an agreement that gave partial success to al]. 
The treaty was probably the best agreement the parties could have reached 
under the constraints of the situation. It could have served as the 
basis for a reasonable working relationship had the provisions of the 
treaty been carried out by all parties. The fact that the parties did 
not abide by the provisions of the agreement does not, however, downgrade 
the quality of the agreement. Any agreement can work only if the parties 
to it are willing to abide by its provisions. 
We see that the Cohen and Beisecker models have served as 
effective modes for analysis of the processes by which the treaties 
were negotiated. The effectiveness of the tools in this analysis 
would ivdicate that they may be used as models for analyzing other 
mixed-motive bargaining situations. The strength of the Cohen model 
is its abi]ity to explain the actions within the bargaining process. 
We have seen in this analysis that search, strategy and persuasion were 
essential ingredients in the bargaining process which led to the treaties. 
This analysis indicated that the model was largely correct in indica-
ting the relationship between the bargaining processes. This is, 
persuasion is usually the first step, fo~1owed·by strategy, anct searc-h-
comes only after persuasion and strategy have fai]ed to produce an 
acceptable agreement. 
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The strength of the Beisecker model is that it conceptualizes 
the specific communication behaviors and strategies that are used in 
the search, strategy and persuasion modes of the bargaining process. 
Although Cohen's model adequately indicates how one might expect the 
bargaining process to unfold, it does not indicate how each of these 
procedures are manifest. Beisecker's model of cooperative and competi-
tive behaviors provides the tool to analyze the specific communication 
actions of the actors in the bargaining process. 
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